More Than Just Victims: Gender and Post-Civil-Conflict Reconstruction

1. Introduction

“[L]eveling the playing field—where women and men have equal chances to become socially and politically active, make decisions, and shape policies—is likely to lead over time to more representative, and more inclusive, institutions and policy choices and thus to a better development path.” – The World Bank, 2011

Peace agreements and moves towards reconstruction efforts are more sustainable and effective when women are involved in the peace-building process. Bringing women to the negotiating table improves the quality of agreements reached and enhances the likelihood of implementation as all actors and stakeholders are involved in the process towards reconstruction. It has also been proven that bringing women to the peace table leads to an improvement in the quality of agreements reached primarily because of the unique skillsets and experiences that women bring forth (Klein 309).

This essay will attempt to establish that women are disproportionately impacted by civil conflicts and wars. In addition, although women carry burdens heavier than men during times of war, their collective experiences and skillsets are more than often left undermined. Consequently,
controlling parties tend to ignore or exclude women from the negotiating table and women often face overt discrimination when making attempts towards influencing conflict resolution (Shepherd 54). This essay will further this claim by comparing and contrasting efforts towards post-war reconstruction in Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Sri Lanka in order to claim that gendered perspectives must feature high on conflict resolution agendas. In particular, this essay will argue that reconstruction efforts which took into account indirect socio-economic consequences of wars upon women and allowed women to engage in meaningful political participation, have been more successful than efforts that have relegated women to the peripheries.

2. Setting Parameters: Scope Limitations

Ignoring gender difference in research has reinforced the notion that male norms and male behaviour are extrapolated and presented as the human norm. This paper aims to establish that there needs to be further inquiry into gendered dynamics of armed conflicts. However, a significant drawback within the perusal of this research is the fact that data on the feminine experience of war is largely uncertain. In addition, data often fails to distinguish with respect to gender and age (Skjelsbaek and Smith 4). Furthermore, acts of sexual violence – rape, in particular – is underreported despite being characterized as a weapon of war. Rape, as well as murder, was used in genocidal attacks on Rwandan Tutsis in 1994; reports from the Human Rights Watch published in 1994 state that virtually every Tutsi woman who survived a massacre was raped (5).

In wars, women are central as victims, but more often than not, marginal as agents. This paper aims on answering and evaluating a fundamental question: If post-war decision-making becomes more inclusive towards women, will it make a difference? It must, however, be borne in mind that this argument is not claiming, in any way possible, that the way to change post-conflict political climates is to ‘add women and stir’. Rather, it aims to establish that women are
fundamental stakeholders and that a new paradigm must be established: one that is based on the realization that gender is a constituent of the collective political experience and that it is basic to the identity of the state and the structure of the international system (11).

3. Literature Review

This literature review intends on expounding upon post-war reconstruction efforts from a gendered perspective. It will begin by taking into account the gendered nature of conflict, examining correlations between conflict, state power, state regimes, while having a focus upon gender. It will then emphasize upon how post-war reconstruction efforts – from interim stabilization, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security system reform to second generation security promotion designed to prevent and reduce armed violence in the aftermath of war – have regularly ignored the application of a gender analysis to post-conflict reconstruction (Colletta and Muggah 2).

3.1 Wars against Women: Sexual Violence and Sexual Politics

Sexual violence is often used as a deliberate strategy in war and political repression. It must be noted that women, in a variety of contexts, “take up arms” as members of military as well as insurgent groups, and engage in support of and collusion with and are acquiescent towards the use of violence in civil unrest and international conflicts. Nonetheless, the use of violence – interpersonal, state-sanctioned and insurgent – remains a primarily masculine preserve, and that women who enter these terrains do so within a set of long-standing gendered meanings (Kelly 46). Various debates about how a focus on women as victims of conflict constitutes a denial of women’s agency are particularly revealing in this respect. And in most versions of this argument, agency is awarded primarily within the actions of the violator: that is, the position of the agent, for the woman, is confined to either the perpetration of, or the support for, violence (46). Therefore, the
agency that women exhibit via their resistance and their acts of coping with personal victimization incurred via wars, as well as through collective opposition to acts of violence or war, is often disavowed (46).

Feminist scholars have also argued that “terror”, for the woman, is often found in the home, and follows her to the battlefield: that the primary oppressors of women are often found amongst their immediate family, who silence women through coercive means. These routine, often unremarked, daily encounters with violence and coercion were understood as powerful constraints on women’s freedom, including their ability to participate in movements for economic and political rights (52). Consequently, when it comes to the incidence of violence in wars, women are often found facing double-jeopardy: 70 percent of the world’s refugees are women, in many countries of the Global South the military budget exceeds that for health and education combined, and there is a broad lack of sexual safety for women, including the rape of refugees and ‘enemy’ women (53). In addition, sexual violence in wars is not viewed by feminist scholars as different; rather, militarized sexual violence is often perpetrated or encouraged by men who have relations with women they are victimizing: they are often their lovers, sons, brothers, and neighbours.

Rape was used in former Yugoslavia to terrorize populations and inflict maximum humiliation upon communities; it was, however, women who carried the shame and humiliation inflicted as a consequence, who were later shunned and excluded because they embodied the failure of militarized men to ‘protect’ their homeland (53). Staja Zajovic reinforces this notion: ‘A patriarchal brotherhood demonstrates its “male strength” through war. However, the rape of their women is not lived as pain in her body, but as male defeat: he could not protect his own property’ (Zajovic 5). In addition, women bear the brunt of sexual assault via additional layers of injustice, including fear and hatred. Subsequently, feminist scholars – such as Liz Kelly – have argued that
women make “patriarchal bargains” during times of war: they opt for immediate self-protection by allying themselves with more powerful men, rather than support (believe) less powerful women and girls (Kelly 53). Nonetheless, it must be borne in mind that more often than not, these circumstances are not of their own choosing. Invariably, it has to do with notions of honour and shame. In former Yugoslavia, for instance, many still believe that following an act of rape, a women’s honour and that of her family is only retrievable via suicide (54). Thus, women face an impossible choice between silence and stigma – for it to be known publicly that a woman has been ‘dishonoured’ narrows down life choices considerably and anecdotal accounts seem to imply that women who have publicly spoken of their assaults have had to face prostitution (54).

The alternative – silence – is a recurring theme in feminist literature. But it must be borne in mind that both situations – speaking out or silence – have far reaching consequences. In Rwanda, for instance, efforts towards rehabilitation of women who were raped or abused in the Rwandan genocide have not been adequately funded (54). In addition, there has been very little outreach on part of international solidarity networks. While the rape of Rwandan women was on a scale that surpasses the imagination – there are some areas of the country, Liz Kelly claims, where “every woman still alive has been raped by gangs and by individuals in refugee camps – little judicial redress has been achieved (55).

Armed conflict, therefore, creates an atmosphere where limited protections are available for women. Kelly outlines three conclusions of this argument: firstly, limited protections are replaced by condoning and even an outright policy of sexual violence; secondly, there is an increase in the frequency of opportunistic and planned assaults within or close to the conflict zone; thirdly, more violence occurs in public, so that the violation and humiliation of women is witnessed by others in their community (60). In terms of implications, their reach goes far away and beyond
the immediate combat zone: for instance, minimal policing and protection is afforded to women who choose to recede. This may, in turn, be compensated for by the “calling up” of the male population, thus possibly enhancing the security of women if they do not reside close to the zone of conflict (61). Sri Lanka falls as an adequate example exhibiting these contradictory processes: For instance, both, displacement as well as widowhood have helped create situations in which women have had to ensure their survival. While some have embraced the autonomy this offers them – thereby refusing traditional Hindu treatment of widows – others have fallen prey to smaller local paramilitary groups controlling movement of people in and out of certain areas, thus limiting the mobility of women since “checkpoint rape” is commonplace (61).

Armmed conflicts, thus, serve to accentuate the construction of a brutalized masculinity and serve to suspend – particularly within or close to zones of conflict – the limited agency and protection from violence and violation afforded to women.

3.2 Evolving Conflict: A Gendered Understanding and Analysis of Promoting Security after War

Conflict analysis has tended to ignore how a gender analysis could enrich its understanding of the motivations of different actors, or how it could articulate linkages between the personal dimension on one hand, and institutions, trends and interests at local, national and international levels on the other (El-Bushra 66). And while there is overwhelming evidence that ever since the dawn of the new millennium, security promotion activities have evolved and adjusted to the dynamic and rapidly changing post-war landscapes, it must be borne in mind that most security promotion activities are limited in their scope: more often than not, they focus narrowly upon stability and civilian accountability over agents while means of violence are countered with interim stabilization interventions and second generation security promotion activities (Coletta and Muggah 9). The gender dimension, as a consequence, is often left ignored.
Coletta and Muggah cite various reasons for the fallout of negotiated peace accords within the short time span of five years. Most significant within these reasons is the fact that in most fragile post-war scenarios, it is not prudent to expect a practical implementation of conventional disarmament and demobilization, key security sector reforms or the social and economic reintegration of former combatants (9). What makes matters worse, is the rush to introduce mechanisms of interim stabilization without bringing all parties to the table: very often, negotiating parties forego detailed planning of interim stabilization measures, or in other cases, these interventions may not be pursued by peace mediators or negotiating parties, but by the powerful elite and armed groups. Subsequently, while the purpose behind interim stabilization techniques is to avoid the creation of security vacuums in the early stages of post-war transition, the inability to bring all stakeholders to the table may do exactly what they are meant to avoid.

Five emerging types of interim stabilization measures have been listed down by Coletta and Muggah in their analysis. These include the establishment of civilian service corps, military or security sector integration arrangements, creation of transnational security forces, dialogue sensitization programs and different forms of transitional autonomy (11). And while these categories are not mutually exclusive, the idea behind them is to ensure that all stakeholders are brought to the negotiating table during the fragile and often contentious distribution of power.

As section 3.1 illustrated, the involvement of women in war has often been left unattested and dominant assumptions about war have contended that armed conflict is essentially a male pursuit from which women are left largely excluded for their protection. Subsequently, post-war reintegration poses a multitude of problems for women, who are largely left out of negotiations. Nonetheless, El-Bushra argues that conflict alters the social fabric of societies, affecting demographic structures resulting from higher male deaths and ostensibly promotes changes in the
division of labour as women are expected to compensate for the absence or the incapacity of the male labour force by learning new skills and by adapting new economic and reproductive roles – in self-defence and protection, for instance (El-Bushra 78). Subsequently, this leads to a greater sharing of gender roles, with women taking on greater public roles as well as developing more forms of women’s organization, including organizations that take on dynamic roles in reconciliation, peace-building and development (78).

El-Bushra claims that any attempt towards explaining the role of women in post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation efforts will have to take into account three sets of closely intertwined issues: firstly, economic survival and organization; secondly, the personal and affective domain; and thirdly, social and political relations (El-Bushra 78). Examples illustrating these issues include the emergence of women’s organizations as a nascent social force in Somalia, growing mistrust between neighbours in Rwanda post-conflict and the evolving role of women in Uganda in the area of food production. It is necessary to enhance the role of women in the economy post-conflict, El-Bushra argues, for the purpose of their survival, as well as a route towards women’s ‘empowerment’ or ‘autonomy’ as it helps raise awareness of their capacities as well as grants them agency by providing them with a strong economic footing vis-à-vis men (78). Nonetheless, it must be borne in mind that this is an indirect approach towards integrating women into the process of post-conflict reconstruction and reintegration; one that acknowledges their role in society’s social fabric yet relieves them to the peripheries. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that the promotion of a simplistic divide between men on one hand and women on the other is a misnomer: women, even when denied the outward, publically acknowledged forms of power such as holding political office, do exert various forms of influence. Hadendowa women in the Sudan, for instance, who are virtually invisible in the public arena, contribute critically towards the making of decisions
in various situations, include deciding which men of the groups should take up or lay down arms, using poetry, songs and taunts as ways and means of conveying their opinions and using the withdrawal of sexual relations as the ultimate sanction (79).

3.3 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325

On October 31, 2000, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1325 (Shepherd 64). This resolution, in particular, bears significance as it is the first resolution passed by the United Nations Security Council that specifically addresses the distinct and disparate effects of armed conflicts on women and takes into account, their often under-valued and under-utilized contributions towards, both, the prevention as well as the resolution of conflicts, and the upholding of peace and stability (64). Significantly, the Security Council in a UN Press Release (SC/6942) published on October 31, 2000, called for the “adoption of a gender perspective in the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements; active participation of women in the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the support of local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution” (64). Via this groundbreaking resolution, the United Nations Security Council endorses, reiterates and lays emphasis upon a much-needed increase in the role of women in decision-making with regards to the prevention and resolution of conflicts.

Through the passing of Resolution 1325, the Security Council acknowledges – on a much revered platform – that the inclusion of women in post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building processes is not significant primarily because it is fair to include all stakeholders in reconstruction and peace-building negotiations, rather, because the inclusion of women is necessary for the purpose of attain lasting peace and security in contentious conflict zones. A United Nations
“Security Council Resolution 1325 has served as a catalyst for women all over the world to mobilize their efforts to achieve equal participation. Women at the grassroots level in countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq and Sudan have used this resolution to lobby for their voices to be heard in peace-building processes, in post-conflict elections, and in the re-building of their societies.” (Shepherd 65)

Feminist scholars have argued that although Resolution 1325 has been a revolutionary catalyst for change in conflict-ridden countries in the Global South because it provides women with a palpable, sustainable and implementable basis for demanding their inclusion into post-conflict reconstruction efforts, it must be noted that their lies a fundamental disconnect between states that have pledged to ratify this resolution, and the translation of this ratification into visible practice. Women are still significantly underrepresented and or largely absent from peace negotiations (65). And while the significance of the unanimous approval of Resolution 1325 by the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly cannot and should not be downplayed or under emphasized, failure to build upon Resolution 1325 in the form of future resolutions – Shepherd claims that this has been done by “not referring to it or affirming its importance, as well as failing to emphasize commitment to its full implementation” – may, in fact, render the resolution ineffective and obsolete, thereby crippling its effectiveness (66).
4. Theoretical Framework:

It will evaluate the possibility as well as the impact of altering the gender balance in decision-making structures concerned with peace, security and conflict resolution. It will then reinforce this theoretical framework via case studies concerning the role of women in post-conflict reconstruction efforts in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Sri Lanka.

4.1 Women’s Involvement in Negotiations in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

Peace processes and agreements reached as a consequence are responsible for shaping society after the end of a violent conflict. The outcome of these negotiations is likely to form the basis for the structure of the future state, as well as legal provisions which will influence the lives of citizens. Where a wider range of participants are brought to the table for negotiations, the notion of ‘all interested parties’ usually lays focus on political parties, ethnic groups, or religious groups (Ranharter 38). Women, other representatives from civil society, minority groups or people from different class backgrounds are rarely considered, thereby forgetting that the outcome of peace negotiations should and will influence society as a whole (38). It is arguably counterproductive to not have all parts of society involved and represented in negotiations, as sustainable and fruitful development and peace can only be attained and sustained when holistic, all-inclusive participation in peace processes is assured (39).

In the case of the Kurdistan region, while there is no official peace agreement between the Kurdistan Autonomous Region and Baghdad or between different Kurdish factions, there have been numerous negotiations over the last decades. These include the Washington Agreement of 1998, the Helsinki Project of 2007-2009 and numerous initiatives between the leaders of Erbil and between Erbil and Baghdad with the aim of finding lasting solutions to reoccurring problems (39). The stance taken by the Kurdistan Regional Government is that negotiation teams align with
traditionally held views; that is, they mostly comprise of old fighters or male politicians (39). In addition, although the percentage of female politicians in the Kurdistan Regional Government is steadily increasing, their role in negotiations is limited. Interestingly, the absence of gender equity is not limited to just the Kurdistan Regional Government, but spills into other groups when instances of outside help being sought are taken into account: for instance, at the Washington Agreement, signed by representatives of the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, which was mediated by the US, no women were present (40). Subsequently, in the Kurdistan Region, general perception holds that it is the ‘old warriors’ who retain power and influence, rather than a shared arrangement with newer parties and a more representative cross section of the population (40).

Nonetheless, despite being underrepresented at official peace negotiations, Kurdish women have tapped into various platforms for the purpose of voicing their opinions at the grassroots level. In fact, as many Kurds testify, it was the women of Iraqi Kurdistan who had the role of resolving conflicts in society, especially in the past when Kurds lived in rural settlements (40). This, however, is not enough. The lack of women on negotiating tables leads towards a loss in chance for them to speak out for the purpose of voicing their needs and speaking out for other women’s rights, the incidence of which could have led to enhanced equality in legislation and implementation of legislation (41).

4.2 The Role of Women in the Post-Conflict Efforts in Sri Lanka

Writing in 1995, Kumudini Samuel explores the role of women in conflict resolution in Sri Lanka and focuses on the activism of women and women’s groups in Sri Lanka’s predominantly Sinhala south and Tamil northeast. Sri Lanka, in particular, is a unique case as it exhibits women bound by patriarchal control and subordinate to male leadership, yet appropriating their roles as
“wives and mothers” for the purpose of bringing about significant changes in political power balances (Samuel 184). Samuel also sheds significant light upon the election of President Kumaratunge in 1994, with an overwhelming majority of the vote across all ethnic groups, claiming that Kumaratunge’s election sought a political solution to the ethnic conflict between the Sinhala south and the Tamil north. In addition, it must also be borne in mind that Kumaratunge’s election campaign came in the wake of her husband’s assassination and painted her as a “mother figure” who could lead the nation out of crisis. Furthermore, she alienated a significant section of her population – including her opposition as well as her supporters – for not establishing an inclusive peace process: women part members and parliamentarians were not involved – even though some of them were themselves victims of political violence and had been actively involved in human rights efforts, in particular, with issues of disappearances and extra judicial killings (199).

Nonetheless, Samuel argues that women have, at local levels, played a major role in the de-escalation of conflict and the mitigation of its effects. Fundamental, in this process, is the protection and the promotion of human rights, and here, women-led groups have been particularly involved (200). Their actions have been instrumental in the establishment of Sri Lanka’s Commission of Investigation into involuntary removal or disappearances of persons. Furthermore, she proposes that women can help strengthen civil intervention in the conflict through campaigns for demilitarized zones and for humanitarian access to conflict areas, and for safe evacuation and settlement of civilian populations (200). Lastly, she lays emphasis upon the fact that women have always been active participants in the opposition of conflict and human rights violations in Sri Lanka, and that they should assert their presence in the process of conflict mitigation in Sri Lanka by superseding their traditionally held gendered roles – as wives, mothers and caretakers – in order
to increase participation at local and national levels in a process that can bring about permanent solutions to conflicts.

5. Conclusion

History, as well as modern theory, have played a dual role of documenting the role of women in wars as victims of rape and sexual violence. While it has been established that women are disproportionately impacted by wars and civil conflicts, it must be borne in mind that the role and the image of women as victims of conflicts has now begun to evolve: the image of women has changed from being shackled to the chains of victimhood and suppression as silent actors in conflicts, to active participants on negotiating tables as peace-builders and peace makers. While the existence of official documentation – such as Resolution 1325, encouraging the “involvement of women at all levels for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict, and supporting local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous process for conflict resolution” – is a significant step in a positive direction, it must be borne in mind that the participation of women is primarily through informal means (Shepherd 66). The achievement of women’s inclusion and gender awareness are still treated as an aspiration, rather than a requirement, and there are no monitoring mechanisms in place for the purpose of ensuring implementation and accountability (Ranharter 38). Furthermore, only one in 40 peace treaty signatories over the past 25 years – statistics tabulated up till 2013 – have been women, and the percentage of women as chief mediators is even lower (38). And even in regions such as the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, where women play an enhanced role in politics in general, the presence of women at negotiations is not supported.

This lack of women’s participation in post-conflict reconstruction efforts has serious implications towards the future of conflict-ridden regions. Having only men at negotiating tables poses the fundamental question of how representative these negotiations really are, in terms of the
whole populace, and whether the outcome of these negotiations will adequately meet the hopes and expectations of the residents of the region. In addition, while the sole inclusion of former rebels and fighters in peace negotiations may be useful for the purpose of placing an immediate end to a violent struggle, women’s participation in these negotiations is crucial and vital for future balanced development of these countries as a whole (Ranhart 41).
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Examining Changes in External Support: Pakistan and Rwanda

Although proxy warfare was employed extensively in the Cold War, its end has not been accompanied by a concomitant reduction in conflicts involving external states and their client rebel groups. Byman et al. examine 74 post-Cold War insurgent movements and find that 44 of them contained evidence of external involvement (9). However, despite the common incidence of external involvement in civil wars, there has been a lack of comprehensive theoretical work on patron-client relationships in the post-Cold War environment. Specifically, the changing nature of these relationships calls for greater attention. To what extent can an external patron influence a rebel group? Why do certain rebel groups renge on their patron’s demands? In order to answer these questions, I propose a theory that identifies two possible causes of variation in external sponsorship: states switch their sponsored group when it fails to achieve policy objectives or when rebel groups break off the relationship leading states to look for new clients. My main argument is that divergence of interests between the state and the rebel group leads to changes in external sponsorship.

In the first section, I will review theoretical work on different aspects of the patron-client relationship. In the second section, I will apply my theory using two diverse cases. First, I will examine Pakistan’s relationship with Hezb-e-Islami. Then, I will move on to Rwanda’s short-lived
patronage of the AFDL. This will be followed by a comparison of the two cases. I conclude by saying that misalignment of interests limits state oversight of rebel groups.

**Literature Review**

Idean Salehyan’s work on the delegation of war to rebel groups in rival states provides an important starting point in studying the rationale behind a state’s decision to support an insurgency. Criticizing the state-centric approach taken by most scholars (496), he focuses on civil wars as a continuation of international relations by explaining rebel group delegation as form of indirect warfare between states (495). The principal-agent theory is central to his analysis, as he highlights the possibility of adverse selection and agency slack occurring that states have to weigh against the benefit of incurring few costs in selecting such a strategy. Salehyan also looks at the advantages and problems of accepting external patronage from the perspective of the rebel groups. While external aid can augment the offensive capabilities of rebel groups against the state, there are prospects of potential agency loss on the rebels’ side also (507). Moreover, rebel groups can face domestic opposition for following the directives of an external state (507).

Henning Tamm offers a different explanation for patron-client relationships. He draws upon inter-state alliance theories and highlights their applicability to the study of cooperation between state and non-state actors in civil wars (154). He defines transnational alliances as those that “are formed when the ruler of one state and the leader of a rebel group from another state decide to cooperate in the security realm” (152). Linking transnational alliances to political survival of the external state’s ruler, he contends that external states ally with rebel groups when they face the prospects of an internal rebellion (155). Moreover, rulers want to avoid the threat of coups by maintaining the allegiance of key members of their regime either through revenues generated from resource extraction in the rebels’ area of control (158) or through support of the
members’ co-ethnics in the rebel group (160). Although the analysis is limited to civil wars in Africa (155), it provides a useful lens to view patron-client relations and furthers the contention made by Salehyan that concepts from international relations can be extended to the field of civil war research.

Building on the principal-agent analysis of Salehyan’s theory of delegation, Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham present characteristics that are more likely to make a rebel group eligible for external support. They conclude that groups with moderate organizational strength and religious or ethnic ties across state boundaries are in a better position than others to receive foreign aid (727). External states take steps to monitor rebel groups to alleviate agency slack. Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham argue that both states and rebel groups screen each other through “a two-way process”; preference similarity can reduce the risk for agency slack for both actors (717). Thus, external states will prefer rebel groups with similar ideological, religious or ethnic bonds and vice versa (715). This insight is helpful for studying the decisions of external states to sponsor a particular group over others and allows for the comparison of selection criteria across different cases of rebel sponsorship.

External state support also has implications for conflict resolution. It can complicate the settlement process by making the acceptance of peace agreements conditional on the accommodation of the external actor’s demands (Cunningham 225; Salehyan, “Transnational Rebels” 227). External states can also reduce prospects of conflict resolution by providing sanctuaries to rebel groups. Salehyan notes that the presence of refugee camps and diasporas, weak neighboring states or an international rivalry contributes towards the rebels using foreign territory to regroup and mobilize (“Transnational Rebels” 241). Salehyan further studies sanctuaries as a source of inter-state disputes (“No Shelter Here”). Finding that rebel sanctuaries
increase the prospects of militarized interstate disputes between states (57) and lead to a substitution effect in the case of rival states, resulting in indirect interstate conflict (58), Salehyan points towards the limitation of dyadic analyses that do not incorporate the “domestic-international divide” (64).

Salehyan, Siroky and Wood examine the effect of external support on the levels of violence committed by rebel groups by employing the principal-agent framework (638). In addition to rebel groups engaging in violent behavior against the state’s wishes due to moral hazard, state sponsorship itself can function as an impetus for abuse against the local population as patrons may encourage their client to target a specific ethnic group or rebels may carry out violent acts in order to signal their efficacy (639). However, external states that are democracies and have human rights lobbies are less likely to have sponsor groups that target civilians as they can be held accountable for misbehavior by the international system (642). This effect may be mitigated in the case of multiple sponsorship because groups have another patron to turn to should one of them sanction the group for violent behavior (656).

It is important to note that rebel groups have the choice to desert their external sponsor when presented with undesirable policies. Popovic also uses a principal-agent analysis and presents an organizational theory of rebel defection (4). He argues that groups with weak command and control structures facing extended delegation chains hold reduced accountability to the external state (5). Moreover, groups with multiple factions are also prone to defections, as the factions can function as autonomous units, thus reducing the ability of the central authority to monitor these groups (6). Popovic also finds that ideological ties between the rebel group and the sponsor are not likely to guard against defection (19). This finding runs contrary to claims that
ideological convergence reduces the costs of monitoring and calls for further examination in case-based studies.

Theory and Scope

I also draw upon the principal-agent theory used in the studies examined in the literature review. I assume that states and rebel groups have imperfect information about each other’s intentions and face moral hazards that they will try to alleviate by allying with actors that have similar preferences using ethnicity, religion or ideology as selection criteria as proposed by Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham (715). States have foreign policy objectives that would like to fulfill through delegation, and rebel groups have their own aims such as capture of the state structure. These goals might overlap to some extent, which will entail patron-client cooperation. In other scenarios, the interests of the external state and the insurgent group might diverge and cause the external state to switch its support to another group. I identify two sources of change in external patronage, one initiated by the state and the other by the rebel group. First, we can expect to see the external state switching its support to another rebel group when it is unable to achieve its policy objectives through its current client. Second, as pointed out by Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham (717), the presence of an external state sponsor can negatively affect the domestic image of the rebel group. In such a case, the group will take steps to sever the relationship, thus resulting in the external state backing other insurgents. By taking into account these two drivers of change in external support, I want to highlight the limited ability of states to continuously back and monitor an insurgent group given the vicissitudes of civil wars and the capacity of rebel groups to operate independently despite external backing.

The theory makes a generalizable claim about why patron-client relationships in civil wars disintegrate. By being broad, it does not specify a detailed causal mechanism that leads to such an
outcome since processes that result in external support variation differ from case to case. Thus, the
explanatory potential of the theory is limited outside the cases examined. In addition, drivers of
external change can differ from the ones highlighted in this study. Moreover, the case studies
include diverse rebel groups that have followed vastly different historical trajectories; therefore, a
comparison between the two might not seem fair. Nonetheless, despite numerous distinctions, a
number of parallels can be drawn in the nature of support extended by the states.

Case Studies

Pakistan and Hezb-e Islami

During the Soviet occupation, Pakistan’s proxy war was led entirely by the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI), thus giving the military an unprecedented amount of control over policy and
operations. The military dictatorship led by General Zia-ul-Haq was certainly an enabling
condition that allowed the military and the ISI to gain this prominent role. Given the military’s
historical opposition to politics, the ISI purported to have “a purely military” perspective of
Pakistan’s role in the civil war (Rubin 199). The agency was involved in drawing up battle plans
and overseeing the execution of the important missions by sending officers to Afghanistan (Rubin
201). In addition, the ISI served as a conduit for the allocation of resources, such as arms, among
the various Mujahidin parties (Yousaf 96; Rubin 201). Exclusive control over the distribution of
weapons was critical to Pakistan’s ability to monitor and control the insurgent groups. The head
of the Afghan Bureau of the ISI, Mohammad Yousaf, wrote, “I had a carrot to offer. My stick was
to withhold the weapons” (103). Hence, commanders that followed Pakistan’s directives gained a
larger share of the military aid (Rubin 196) with the greatest being given to Hezb-e-Islami in 1987
(Yousaf 105).
However, successful operations alone did not establish the ISI’s bias towards the Hezb-e-Islami and its leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. A number of other factors ensured that Hekmatyar received more attention from the military. Rubin mentions two criteria that determined ISI backing for a particular group: “ideological proximity” and “weak links to society” (201). In addition to gaining strategic depth in Afghanistan, General Zia-ul-Haq wanted to be at the forefront of an Islamic revolution in the region (Nojumi 128). Since Hekmatyar was a staunch Islamist who wanted an Afghan government based on religious principles (Yousaf 40), he shared his patron’s political beliefs, which made him the favorite to execute Pakistan’s policy in Afghanistan (Nojumi 128). Hekmatyar also had close political connections to the Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan (JIP), which was one of the central backers of the Zia regime and this allowed him considerable influence inside the military circles in Pakistan (Nojumi 119). Moreover, the members of the Hezb-e-Islami were overwhelmingly Sunni and Pashtun (Rubin 215). Pakistan allowed the Hezb to recruit from the refugee camps along its border with Afghanistan whom Hekmatyar trained though a chain of institutions, thus filling the ranks of Hezb with soldiers unfamiliar with the traditional tribal structure of Afghan society (Rubin 215).

While not explicitly stated, another reason why Hezb-e-Islami appealed to the ISI was its organizational strength and structure. Authors point towards the high degree of centralization within the insurgent group (Rashid 19; Nojumi 101; Rubin 214). For the members of Hezb-e-Islami, the party took precedence over other loyalties and the soldiers owed allegiance to Hezb rather than the field commander (Rubin 214). The supply of committed fighters from the refugee camps that were educated in the group’s chain of schools ensured that the Hezb was composed of members that adhered to organizational beliefs and setup (Rubin 214). The strength of the organization reduced the risk of potential agency loss, as groups with strong chains of commands
are more likely to execute directives from external patrons. Since the insurgency was directed by the ISI, it is natural that this level of organization and centralism appealed to the officers in the agency.

After Najibullah’s departure in April 1992, following the collapse of the Soviet Union a year earlier, Pakistan still retained its objective of strategic depth and aimed to put up a regime that was conducive to its foreign policy goal. That meant its ally, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, was to be given a central position in any transitional agreement, otherwise, Pakistan would have had to face an unfriendly central government in Kabul that might undermine its security and raise the Pashtunistan issue. However, subsequent events denied Pakistan the opportunity to establish a puppet government in the capital. On April 25, Kabul was taken by the northern alliance that consisted of Ahmed Shah Masood, commander of the Jamiat, and Abdul Rashid Dostum, the Uzbek leader of the militia, Junbish, after the failure of rebel leaders to reach an agreement over a power-sharing formula (Rubin 271). On April 26, 1992, the Peshawar Accords were formulated that stated the presidential office would be transferred to Rabbani, the leader of Jamiat, who would hold the office for four months after which elections would take place (271). The accords also bestowed the portfolio for defense upon Masood, Hekmatyar’s main opponent in the Afghan theater (Nojumi 113). While the office of Prime Minister was awarded to the Hezb-e-Islami, Hekmatyar was not allowed to nominate himself, which, according to Khan, exhibited the lack of ISI involvement in the agreement (45). Therefore, the accord meant political disaster for Hekmatyar and his allies in the Pakistani intelligence agency. Refusing to accept the agreement, Hekmatyar launched rocket assaults on Kabul until August that resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths (Rubin 272).
In order to stem the fighting, a new set of agreements were drafted in March 1993 that were known as the Islamabad Accords (Khan 50). Although they rectified the mistake made in the previous accord by making Hekmatyar the Prime Minister, Masood retained the ministry of Defense that caused another round of infighting and protest by Hekmatyar, thus resulting in the continuation of hostility between the rebel groups (50). Not only did Hekmatyar fail to enter Kabul through political means, he was unsuccessful on the military front as well. Hekmatyar tried to escape his marginalization by forging a number of short-lived alliances with other groups in the Afghan conflict (Dorronsoro 244). However, by that time, the Hezb had exhausted its military means and lacked political capital due to the rigidity of its leader who was unwilling to compromise. Moreover, Kabul was still under the control of Masood and Rabbani who put up a strong front against the Hezb. The year 1993 marked a deadlock in Afghanistan, and Pakistan was unable to achieve its objective during the time (Human Rights Watch). This period also marks the shift in Pakistan’s policy towards the Hezb-e-Islami, as its repeated failure to capture the capital caused Pakistan to look for other Pashtun insurgent groups (Rashid 26).

The same year was also critical in terms of Pakistan’s Afghan policy that was transferred into civilian hands after the dismissal of the Nawaz government. With Benazir Bhutto in office, her Minister of Interior, Naseerullah Babar, assumed the central role for directing the policy (Dorronsoro 245). This change in the center of authority had marked implications for the Hezb-e-Islami. The group’s orthodox support base in Pakistani political circles was the ISI, which was losing its prestige due to “the failure of Hekmatyar to capture Kabul and the shortage of funds” (Rashid 188). Moreover, the fall of the Soviet Union heralded the political and economic opening of the Central Asian Republics and the emergence of new markets. This presented Pakistan with new economic opportunities, and, hence, it formulated another foreign policy objective in addition
to its traditional goal of strategic depth: a land route to Turkmenistan (Rashid 26). With politicking by Pashtun military officers and the Jamaat-e-Ulema-e Islami Pakistan (JUIP), the route through the South in Kandahar was chosen (26). Babar had posted the Taliban in Herat some time before the Pakistani consulate was opened up in the province (Dorronsoro 245). The Taliban link to Babar was made possible through the connections they shared with JUIP, which was close to the Bhutto government (245).

The Taliban proved to be an ideal substitute for the Hezb-e-Islami. It was mainly composed of Pashtuns (Matinuddin 27) and proved itself as a potent force that was capable of executing Pakistan’s policy in Afghanistan. The Taliban liberated a Pakistani convoy heading through Kandahar and subsequently took the province in 1994 (Rashid 29). Pakistan’s support to the Taliban and its rupture of ties with Hezb can be validated by the fact that the state helped them capture Spin Boldak, Hekmatyar’s weapons facility (27). The Taliban gradually eroded Hekmatyar’s territorial control, presumably, with the backing of Pakistan that provided them with weapons and recruits from madrassas across the border. For example, the group took Hekmatyar’s headquarters of Charasyab in 1995, thus causing defections of Hezb members to the Taliban (Matinuddin 72). By 1995, Pakistan had sidelined Hezb-e-Islami, as they ceased to receive aid from their former patron (Dorronsoro 250) and lost soldiers and bases to the superior Pashtun force that was now advancing rapidly and consolidating territory under its control.

*Rwanda and the AFDL*

The formation of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) was spurred by Rwanda’s security concerns that emanated from refugee camps in the Congo that hosted Hutu refugees who had fled after the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) established its rule in 1994. In the aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide, members of the Rwandan Armed
Forces (FAR) and the Interahamwe escaped to the camps where they trained and armed Hutus to carry out attacks in Rwanda (Tamm 165). The location of the camps in the Eastern Kivu provinces next to the Rwandan border facilitated the Hutu insurgency (Curtis). The ruler of Zaire, Mobutu, abetted the ex-FAR and Interahamwe by providing them with arms and permission to train insurgents in Eastern Congo (Tamm 166). Paul Kagame, the Vice President of Rwanda, feared the toppling of his regime by Hutu rebels and decided to eliminate the threat by invading Congo in 1996, which led to the First Congo War (166).

The Rwandan incursion had three principal goals: removal of refugee camps along Rwanda’s border, neutralization of Hutu militias and the ouster of Mobutu (Pomfret). While the invading forces consisted of units from different states, the Rwandans, led by Colonel James Kabarebe, directed the operations (Stearns 94; ch. 7). Young recruits from training camps established in the east bolstered the Rwandan forces (95; ch. 8). Although the Rwandan army was engaged in territorial acquisition from the end of August, the seizure of Kinshasa had required a political cover that would have prevented the Rwandans from being labelled as an occupying power. The purpose of the AFDL was to provide the Rwandans with “a Congolese front” to avert international condemnation (Roessler and Verhoeven 30) and it “had little political or military significance other than providing a smoke screen for Rwandan and Ugandan involvement” (Stearns 74; ch. 6).

After learning of plans that involved Hutu hostility against the Congolese Tutsi called Banyamulenge and an invasion of Rwanda by Hutus and ex-FAR soldiers, the AFDL was deployed in Congo by Kagame in October (Pomfret). The alliance was composed largely of Tutsis, including the Banyamulenge from Kivu (Tamm 166), which is understandable as Kagame himself belonged to the same ethnic group. Moreover, three of the political groups that made up the AFDL were
based in Eastern Congo (Reyntjens 105). This presented a problem for Kagame as the group could be accused of being nothing more than a Tutsi proxy group. However, the induction of Laurent Kabila into the alliance constituted a balance against the Tutsi majority. Since Kabila’s origins were in Katanga, he could give a “national” face to the group (107). This also explained why the old revolutionary was made the leader of the nascent movement. Karegeya, the head of the Rwandan intelligence, remarked, “We weren’t looking for a rebel leader. We just needed someone to make the whole operation look Congolese” (qtd. in Stearns 72; ch. 6).

Contrary to Rwanda’s expectations, Mobutu’s overthrow and his replacement by Kabila did not turn out to be a panacea for their problems. Kabila’s rule was dysfunctional and authoritarian, which hardly made him a reliable ally. He concentrated power in the executive, failed to form a legislature and took responsibility for personally overlooking the state’s expenditures (Stearns 131; ch. 12). In other words, “statism, voluntarism, authoritarianism and incoherence” dominated Kabila’s government (Reyntjens 156). Moreover, Kabila fomented the dissolution of the group that had brought him to power. He gradually eliminated and marginalized the founding members of the AFDL and the organization ceased to exist (161). In explaining his actions, Kabila evoked a narrative of external meddling that foreshadowed his future initiatives: “They relied on an external legitimacy. It was a conglomerate of opportunists and adventurers” (qtd. in Reyntjens 161).

Although by 1997, Rwanda’s military engagement within Congo came to end with Kabila in Kinshasa (Reyntjens 145), Rwanda attempted to monitor its client by choosing to maintain Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) units inside the territory (Roessler and Verhoeven 134). The extent of RPA’s presence in Congo’s security structure can be gauged from the fact that Kabila’s bodyguard and head of the presidential guard were both Rwandans (Stearns 132; ch. 12). While
Kabila realized the importance of the Rwandan army given that he lacked any coherent national force of his own to prevent threats to his newly installed regime and had asked Kabarebe to take up the leadership of the Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC) (Roessler and Verhoeven 34), the presence of Rwandan and Tutsi soldiers generated a backlash from the local population. Misbehavior, such as verbal abuse and physical punishments, by the Banyamulenge and Rwandans was common and their supremacist attitude towards the Congolese engendered resentment against Rwanda (Reyntjens 147). The Rwandans benefited from the deployment of RPA personnel as it helped them alleviate moral hazards that would have occurred had the AFDL been left on its own (Roessler and Verhoeven 35). However, Kabila found it increasingly harder to justify the presence of Rwandans in the army and the Congolese Tutsis in the government. On one hand, he was indebted to Rwanda for the position he occupied, but, on the other hand, he also had to please the Congolese people that saw him as their liberator from Mobutu’s oppressive rule. His reliance on Rwanda “soon became a mortgage in terms of internal legitimacy” (Reyntjens 167).

Relations between Kabila and Rwanda continued to deteriorate. In an interview given to The Washington Post in July 1997, Kabila publicly disclosed Rwanda’s involvement in what had been portrayed as an internal rebellion by saying that “the Rwandan Government planned and directed the rebellion” and “provided training and arms for those forces even before the campaign to overthrow Mobutu began last October” (Pomfret; qtd. in Reyntjens 57). These comments were a source of humiliation for Kabila who had tried to cultivate a façade of independence from external powers (Reyntjens 140). Moreover, Kagame’s statements also confirmed the arguments of his critics who were already against the overwhelming Tutsi membership of the AFDL (140). At that time, Rwanda was occupied with fighting a Hutu insurgency inside its borders that was the result of its invasion and destruction of Hutu camps that had sent refugees back into Rwandan
territory (Stearns 135; ch. 13). Since “non-Tutsi elements” of FAC were aiding these insurgents, Kagame’s confidence in Kabila further eroded (Tamm 172).

According to Roessler and Verhoeven, the rulers of the two states faced a commitment problem, which led to preemptive actions by the actors in order to maintain their security (26). Kabila took a number of measures to cut off his ties to Rwanda and caused it to invade Congo for the second time to replace the government. Although the trigger of the Second Congo War is disputed, Kabila’s decision to back the ex-FAR and Interahamwe was a significant factor that provoked Rwanda (Stearns 136; ch. 13). In May 1998, Kabila started providing military aid to the ex-FAR and extremist Hutus operating in Eastern Congo (Roessler and Verhoeven 42). The motivation behind the action was the fear of his removal from power through a coup at the hands of the Rwandans and Tutsis in Congo (Stearns 136; ch. 13). It was also a strategy to build a strong military force of his own that would be able to stand against the RPA (136). The second act of defiance took place on July 13 when Kabila asked Kabarebe to step down as the commander of the FAC and gave the post to his wife’s brother (Roessler and Verhoeven 43). On 26 July, the Defence Ministry instructed “the Rwandan and other foreign military” to evacuate Congo as a last step to purge the state of Rwandan influence (Reyntjens 169).

Responding to Kabila’s hostile overtures, Rwanda oversaw the creation of a new rebel outfit to launch an insurgency against Kabila. On August 2, 1998, an FAC unit based in the Eastern city of Goma announced their intention to depose Kabila from the presidency on charges of “misrule, nepotism and corruption”, thus sparking a new rebellion in the East (Reyntjens 194). The rebels were given the name of The Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) on August 12 (195). Much like the last rebellion sponsored by Rwanda, the RCD also consisted of Banyamulenge who felt that they were being targeted by Kabila’s regime (195). Their mobilization was possible due
to the measures taken by Kabarebe during his tenure as the head of the Rwandan forces. He had armed and deployed FAC units in the Eastern Congo, which were directed to organize against Kabila after Kabarebe’s dismissal from the military (Stearns 195-96; ch. 13). Admitting Rwanda’s role in backing the RCD, Kagame said, “Rwanda felt honor bound to support (the Banyamulenge mutiny) on grounds of ethnic solidarity, but also to rectify the error of putting Kabila in power” (qtd. in Reyntjens 195).

Analysis: A Comparison between Rwanda and Pakistan

A number of parallels can be drawn between the support extended by Pakistan and Rwanda. In both cases, the state’s decision to delegate foreign policy objectives to rebel groups operating in a hostile neighbor’s territory was motivated by security concerns. The militaries of Pakistan and Rwanda were involved in the direction of operations at least in the initial stages of the insurgencies. In the Rwandan case, the RPA forces led the first rebellion as Kagame though it too critical to be left to the rebels (Pomfret). Pakistan controlled the strategies followed by the rebel groups and oversaw key operations in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union although its authority declined considerably after the withdrawal. However, unlike the Rwandan military, Pakistani troops did not fight alongside its sponsored rebel group. Hence, this casts doubt on whether Rwanda was purely a case of delegation as Kagame’s security forces were in a much stronger position than the ISI to monitor their client because of Kabarebe’s presence in the governance structure.

Another major similarity is the two states’ bias towards a particular ethnic group. Both of Pakistan’s clients were composed of Pashtuns with a strict Sunni religious orientation. This inclination is partly explained by the presence of political ties between the Pashtun groups and the intelligence agency (Gregory 1016). However, Pakistan conferred its favor upon groups that
refrained from adhering to Pashtun notions of nationalism (1016). Rwanda’s Tutsi regime preferred to create rebel groups with a large Banyamulenge membership. In addition to ethnic ties, the Banyamulenge of Eastern Congo and the RPF were also united in their opposition, first to Mobutu, and then to Kabila. Historically, this group of Congolese Tutsi has never been fully accepted by other Congolese groups, and Rwanda instrumentalized this animosity towards the Banyamulenge as grounds for its incursions (Human Rights Watch, “War Crimes”). Pakistan and Rwanda also provided their respective insurgent groups with a supply of recruits. As mentioned in the case study, Hezb-e-Islami was able to induct new members into the group from among the refugee populations in Pakistani camps, which the ISI helped to train and arm. After advancing into Congo, the AFDL set up training camps to recruit the Congolese Tutsi from the Kivus under the auspices of the Rwandan government.

In addition to functioning as a source of logistical support, both states put their weight behind a central figure with whom they later fell out. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was described by Yousaf as “inflexible” (41), a quality he displayed continuously in the Afghan conflict by his reluctance to share power with his rivals and aspiration to have exclusive control over Kabul, a goal that was shared by Pakistan. Ironically, the drive to achieve the same objective led to his downfall, as his repeated efforts to take over the capital were largely ineffective and reduced his utility for Pakistan. Hoping to install a puppet government, Rwanda led its rebellion into Congo with Kabila at the forefront, a figure it perceived as innocuous and malleable. However, Rwanda was forced to discard Kabila in a short span of time, as he emerged as a threatening figure in the Congolese political landscape. One aspect in which both cases differed was that Hekmatyar’s religious beliefs facilitated his alliance with the Pakistani military while common cultural principles acting as selection criteria were absent from Rwanda’s considerations to back Kabila.
Conclusion

Patron-client relationships hardly remain stable during the course of a civil war and are subject to change. While states and rebel groups try to alleviate the dangers of lost autonomy and information asymmetry, they have limited capacity to ensure a sustained relationship if the preferences of one of the actors diverges. In such circumstances, we will see an external sponsor backing a new insurgent movement, which implies that despite their superiority, states will face clients that will exercise a degree of independence. I attempted to show the two-dimensional aspect of this phenomenon by examining Pakistan and Rwanda and then drawing similarities between them. Pakistan shifted its support to the Taliban when the Hezb-e-Islami could not execute its objective. In Rwanda’s case, Laurent Kabila opposed the actions of his sponsor and provided aid to the Hutu insurgency. I found that both states were motivated by security concerns and ethnic bias, provided their clients with a pool to recruit from and relied on a central figure within their respective groups. The purpose of the paper was to call attention to an aspect of civil wars, which has been acknowledged in a number of studies but has not warranted close examination.
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Pakistan-United States relationship has strictly abided by the dictum that in foreign affairs there are neither friends nor enemies only interests.

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POL 331: Pakistan’s Foreign Relations

Ambassador Iqbal Ahmad Khan

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Introduction

This paper will attempt to analyze Pakistan’s relationship with the United States (US) in light of the dictum that there are no permanent friends, no permanent enemies, only permanent interests—famously stated by Lord Palmerston, a former British Prime Minister. In its 70 year history, Pakistan has had a very complex relationship with the US. This paper will explore this relationship from the time of the creation of Pakistan in 1947 by dividing it into seven main periods: 1947-54, 1954-65, 1965-71, 1971-79, 1979-89, 1989-2001, 2001-present. An analysis of these periods shows that Pakistan-US relationship can be broadly categorized as a transactional relationship shaped by realpolitik which has seen its fair share of peaks and troughs.

Non-Aligned Years (1947-54)

After its independence on 14th August, 1947, Pakistan sought to establish a Muslim, liberal, democratic and modern nation-state that would preserve its security and sovereignty. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, once praised US for having “acted as a beacon of light and had in no small measure served to give inspiration to nations who like us were striving for independence and freedom from the shackles of foreign rule”. Thus, Pakistan was in favor of establishing close relations with democratic countries from the very beginning. This was evident when Jinnah sent Mir Laik Ali to US in October 1947 with a request for economic and military aid of $2 billion. US, however, rebuffed this request politely as it was focusing on rebuilding Western Europe to prevent it from falling under the influence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) – its archrival in the Cold War. Hence, a lack of convergence of interests proved to be an obstacle in the development of close ties between the two states.

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3 Sattar, op. cit., p.13.
However, circumstances changed with the victory of communists in China in 1949 and the Korean War which led to fears in the US that South Asia might also fall prey to communism. Pakistan, meanwhile, had continued to incessantly court US with Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan embarking on a three-week visit to US in 1950 with the aim of portraying Pakistan as a worthy ally in the Cold War. The advent of the Republican administration in 1952 led to greater emphasis on global security and the aggressive implementation of its containment policy against USSR. US initially wanted to involve India in its military alliances but India had its own regional hegemonic aspirations and hence, refused an invitation to join the alliances. Pakistan was also able to manufacture an invitation by the US and readily accepted to join the Western alliances against communism in order to strengthen itself against its greatest existential threat- India.⁴

**Aligned Years (1954-65)**

Relations between the two countries were at its zenith during this period owing to the seamless alignment of interests. Pakistan and US signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement in 1954 and the Bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement in 1959. Pakistan also joined SEATO in 1954 targeting China and the Baghdad Pact (later known as CENTO) in 1955 targeting USSR. Through these pacts, US aimed to contain communism while Pakistan wanted to strengthen itself economically and politically against India. India had proved to be a difficult neighbor from the beginning owing to the water issues, Kashmir dispute and the unfair division of assets and resources.⁵ By receiving $5 billion in economic and military assistance, Pakistan was able to become a powerful defence machine that checked the Indian hegemony in the region while also receiving Western diplomatic support on Kashmir.⁶ US, on the other hand, was able

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⁴ Quoted in Sattar, p.39.
⁶ Sattar, op. cit., p.65.
to establish a military base in Pakistan at Badaber from where it could spy on USSR. Thus, these agreements proved to be mutually beneficial by serving the interests of both countries.

**Divergence of Interests (1965-71)**

Cracks in the relationship began to appear as early as 1962 in the aftermath of the India-China Border War when the West rushed to assist India militarily by providing $120 million to raise six additional divisions.\(^7\) This was done despite assurances by President Kennedy to President Ayub Khan a year earlier that US would consult Pakistan before providing any aid to India.\(^8\) Other factors such as détente between US and USSR, advancement of missile technology and the focus on political and economic engagement by the Democratic Administration in US reduced the importance of Pakistan.

Pakistan was understandably frustrated and sought to carve out its own foreign policy path in response. Pakistan looked to establish closer relations with China- a Communist power. This provided evidence of national interest always taking precedence over any formal alliances or friendly relations. Moreover, Ayub Khan also visited USSR in 1965, the first Pakistani head of state to do so.\(^9\) Pakistan’s gestures earned the ire of Americans and President Lyndon Johnson unilaterally postponed President Ayub Khan’s visit to US as well as Pakistan’s meeting with the World Bank.\(^10\) Pakistan also took a strong stance by considering refusal to renew lease of the US base at Badaber. These relations were further fractured in the wake of the 1965 Pakistan-India war which turned out to be a watershed event in the history of Pakistan-US relations. US imposed arms embargo on Pakistan and reduced economic assistance and even though Pakistan

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7 Sattar, op. cit., p.89.
9 Sattar, op. cit., p.93.
10 Ibid., p.95.
received arms from allies in the Middle East with US blessings, it expected much more. The relations took a turn for the better in July 1971 when Pakistan played a crucial mediatory role in bringing China and the US closer. This role eventually helped Pakistan in the war in 1971 when President Nixon personally intervened to stop India from attacking and occupying West Pakistan. However, on the whole, a deep trust deficit had built up with both parties’ pursuing their own interests rendering all sworn pledges and signed agreements hollow.

**Fractured Relationship (1971-79)**

Despite mutually benefiting each other for a long time, the decade of 70s showed a country always gives precedence to its interests over its friends. Pakistan, having suffered humiliation in the 1971 war, sought to acquire nuclear weapons under the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto-led government while the US was adamant not to allow it. The muted response of Western allies in the wake of ‘Smiling Buddha’- the Indian nuclear test in 1974- shocked Pakistan further. The Bhutto government was already pro-China and the Chinese acceptance of Pakistan’s request in helping build the nuclear bomb pushed it even closer to China. In contrast to the subdued reaction to the Indian test, US actively tried to stop Pakistan by using the carrot-and-stick policy. It was remarked that ‘the Indian horse has bolted, but the Pakistani horse is still in the stable’.

Pakistan was first offered 120 aircrafts in return for canceling a contract with France for the development of a reprocessing plant. Upon refusal, US pressured France to cancel the contract even though Pakistan had paid over a $100 million.\(^\text{11}\) Legislations were enacted to the Foreign Assistance Act of US in 1977 and 1978 known as the Symington and Glenn Amendments.\(^\text{12}\) These legislations specifically targeted Pakistan for pursuing its nuclear program.

\(^\text{11}\) Sattar, op. cit., p.164.
\(^\text{12}\) Ibid.
and not signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The presence of a loophole in the legislation that exempted India and Israel from these sanctions pushed Pakistan and United States further apart.\textsuperscript{13} The relationship continued to be adversely affected in the wake of General Ziaul Haq’s coup in 1977 and was evident from President Carter’s exclusion of Pakistan from his Asian tour after becoming President.\textsuperscript{14} President Carter’s India-centric policy of ‘Regional Influentials’ raised concerns regarding the rise of Indian hegemonic ambitions in Pakistan. The relationship seemed to have hit its nadir in August 1979 when US considered attacking and destroying Pakistan’s nuclear facilities in Kahuta.\textsuperscript{15} Anti-Americanism was also at its peak at this time evident from the burning of the US Embassy in Islamabad in November 1979 (Sattar 166). Thus, close allies of the recent past had seen a massive gulf develop owing to the divergence of interests.

**Strategic Relationship (1979-89)**

A dramatic shift in the relationship became inevitable after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 leading to the simultaneous existence of convergence and divergence of interests. US National Security Council adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski recommended to President Carter that “this will require a review of our policy towards Pakistan, more guarantees to it, more aid, and alas, a decision that our security policy toward Pakistan cannot be dictated by our non-proliferation policy”.\textsuperscript{16} Pakistan, that was denied economic and military assistance, put under crippling sanctions and made to fend for itself in the wilderness during the 70s soon became a frontline ally of the US. The Glenn and Symington Amendments were conveniently waived off through Congressional Approval. The pressure was practically

\textsuperscript{13} Sattar, op. cit., p.164.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p.165
turned off overnight as countering the Soviet invasion became a priority for the US. Pakistan also assured US that it would not develop nuclear weapons or transfer sensitive weapons.\textsuperscript{17} Under the Reagan Administration, Pakistan received $3 billion over five years and US also agreed to consider the sale of 40 F-16 aircrafts to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{18} Thus, a strategic yet transactional relationship had been established yet again which allowed CIA to play its covert war in Afghanistan against the Soviets and avenge its humiliation in Vietnam while Pakistan was able to avoid the nuclear sanctions and attract massive American assistance.

**Souring Relationship (1989-2001)**

The frontline ally garnering international admiration and respect lost all prestige as soon as the Soviets left Afghanistan. Pakistan, which was lauded for its courageous role against the Soviet intervention, soon found itself on the brink of being labeled a state-sponsor of terrorism for its role in Indian-held Kashmir by the very allies who had been strategically involved with it for a decade. Nuclear issues came to the fore again with United States activating the Pressler Amendment in 1990- something Presidents Reagan and Bush had ignored for five years. US proved to be a fickle partner by failing to honor its pledge of providing $700 million to Pakistan annually from 1988-94. The relationship was further damaged when US refused to transfer F-16s and other defence equipment to Pakistan despite billions of dollars already paid.\textsuperscript{19}

Pakistan was also left to face the fallback of the Afghan civil war as US left the region as soon as the Soviets had left Afghanistan. Pakistan had to bear the burden of the Kalashnikov culture and Afghan refugees while it was politically isolated and economically crippled. Pakistan also did little to help its case. It recognized the Taliban government in Afghanistan which was

\textsuperscript{17} US Department of State, 16 September 1981, *Documents*, ed. K. Arif, p.457.
\textsuperscript{18} Quoted in Sattar, p.177.
\textsuperscript{19} Sattar, op. cit., p.251.
globally denounced by everyone including the Muslim countries. Taliban had provided shelter to Osama Bin Laden, who was involved in carrying out attacks against the US. Even though Pakistan did not have the kind of influence over the Taliban that was perceived globally, yet pursuing a narrow-minded policy in Afghanistan isolated Pakistan further.

Pakistan’s relationship with United States was further dented in the wake of Pakistan’s nuclear tests in May 1998 when sanctions were imposed by US as well as its allies. Pakistan, meanwhile, had demonstrated that it would always look to pursue its own interests over the wishes of its friends and allies by exploding the bomb despite enormous international pressure. A new set of sanctions were again imposed in 1999 when General Musharraf ousted the democratically elected government of Nawaz Sharif. Clearly, a strategic ally of the 80s under dictatorial rule of General Zia had no benefits to offer this time around— for the time being.

**War on Terror (2001-present)**

On the verge of becoming a pariah state, Pakistan saw its fortunes change overnight in the wake of the attacks on Pentagon and World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. US under President George Bush had no qualms about enlisting Pakistan as a frontline state in its War on Terror despite leaving it in the lurch after 1989. Pakistan, on the other hand, had no option but to align itself with US in its war against terror once again despite its history of being an unreliable ally. And although Pakistan was labeled ‘a major non-NATO ally’ in 2004, the relationship was once again transactional. Democracy and nuclear sanctions were waived through the Brownback-II and Ackerman Amendment respectively by 2004. Pakistan received around $7 billion over the period 2001-07 with a debt of $1.6 billion written off additionally. Pakistan’s prestige was enhanced with high-level visits from European Union and Japan taking place. Pakistan was also

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20 Sattar, op. cit., p.275.
able to blunt Indian strategy of portraying Pakistan as a state-sponsor of terrorism through the use of propaganda. Another huge unforeseen benefit that Pakistan accrued was to avoid sanctions in the wake of Dr. A.Q. Khan’s transfer of sensitive nuclear technology to Libya, Iran and North Korea. United States, on the other hand, was able to enlist Pakistan’s help in providing over-flight and transit access for its forces fighting in Afghanistan. It also made Pakistan move its forces into FATA to prevent terrorists from fleeing despite the tremendous backlash that Pakistan was bound to face.

The relationship continued to be a roller-coaster ride with cracks appearing and trust deficit building on both sides. US was unable to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan and blamed Pakistan for playing a ‘double game’.21 US also showed lack of respect for Pakistan’s security concerns and disappointed it yet again by allowing transfer of civilian nuclease technology to India in 2008 and not allowing the same for Pakistan.22 The relationship did improve with the arrival of President Obama who endorsed the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act in 2009. The promise that President Obama brought did not come to fruition, however, with 2011 being a particularly difficult year for the ‘strategic allies’. Osama bin Laden was taken out by a US Task Force in Abbottabad without informing Pakistan and breaching its sovereignty in 2011. Later that year, US also attacked a Pakistani checkpoint in Salala killing 24 soldiers and then issuing a reluctant and delayed apology.

US continues to endorse its mantra of ‘Do More’ especially with regards to the Haqqani network but close ties between the two countries still remain in defence, trade, education and social sectors. However, the strategic relationship of the last decade has lost its relevance as the transactional partners do not have anything substantial to offer - for the time being.

21 Sattar, op. cit., p.288.
22 Ibid., p.289
**Conclusion**

Pakistan’s relationship with the United States has been erratic and sensitive to the changing global political landscape based on the periodic convergence and divergence of interests. Both sides have aimed to accrue maximum benefits from each other while protecting their own interests making it a classic transactional relationship. Pakistan used the alliance to check the hegemonic aspirations of its nemesis India as well as protect its nuclear program while US used Pakistan as a tool for its containment policy first and then as an ally in the War on Terror. US, at other times, proved to be a capricious friend and an unreliable ally when Pakistan’s services were not required. Henry Kissinger, a former US Secretary of State once remarked with regards to Pakistan, ‘Gentlemen, there is something indecent about our always proving that we are strong by kicking our allies in the teeth’. This explains the wave of Anti-Americanism that persists in Pakistan despite the massive amounts of assistance that Pakistan has received from US in defence, economy and education.

It is yet to be seen, however, what the advent of President Trump’s Administration means for Pakistan especially with respect to the eradication of terrorism and the emergence of China as a superpower. Any speculation based on historical trends would ascertain that both countries would look to preserve and promote their own interests without regard for all the historical alliances and pledges. Indeed, national interest is the only permanent friend that a country has.

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23 Quoted in Sattar, p.290.
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What role does social capital play in the formation of social movements and how influential are they in the democratization process?

The above question stem reflects a linear process embedded in a wider social system, wherein the role of two variables or concepts, id est. social movements and democratization are directly or indirectly dependent on social capital. There is however another layer wherein the relationship can be reciprocal, in that social movements and democratization may create social capital, inter alia. The paper will attempt to deal with this interdependent relationship and the particular question in three broad sections. In the first section it will attempt to briefly explain and define the concepts of social capital, civil society, social movements, and the democratization process. In the second section the relationship between these concepts will be explored, and it will be argued that the relationship amongst these concepts is an interdependent one. In the final section, the paper will deal with the subject matter at hand; theoretically it will be argued that social capital plays an indispensable role in the creation of social movements; that social movements can act as both challengers and maintainers of democracy in the democratization process depending on the nature of the social movement. Some cases will also be discussed where the said phenomena becomes apparent.

Definitions and Frameworks:

It is worthwhile to point from the outset that the concepts in question represent theoretical approximations to the social reality and as such should be used as ideal types. Because of the
diverse traditions that have contributed to these concepts, the ideal type tool can help in stressing that which is most common to most of these traditions, and can subsequently aid in our analysis.

The term ‘social capital’ has been used in different traditions to broadly refer to; both tangible and intangible resources, such as public spaces, property, actors, people, or human capital, and their values; the relationship among these resources; and their impact on each other (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Ferragina & Arrigoni, 2016). The concept underlying the term has been in use since antiquity, in part because the ideal it refers to forms the fabric of most social and political relationships. Tocqueville employed the concept in the 19th century in order to account for democracy in the United States. Similarly Putnam employs the concept and surveys its decline since the 1950s, and argues that the said reduction negatively effects civil engagement which is a requirement of a strong democracy. He also differentiates between bonding and bridging types of social capital and their varying effects (Putnam, 2000). An epistemological and heuristic undertaking of the term however, is at present beyond the scope of this paper. In this regard Pamela Paxton’s understanding of social capital will be used which is suitable to the present undertaking and also at the same time is in accord with the broader ideal type. Paxton builds on the concept popularized by Bourdieu (1983) and Coleman (1988), to outline two dimensions of social capital. Primarily objective associations among individuals, and secondly association of a reciprocal, trusting, and positive type. Therefore, social capital where present can promote individual and collective good production (Paxton, 2002). It should be noted however, that social capital does not refer to a static group, in that it is often shaped by the actions that it helps to create (Ramos, p.27, 2004).

In the same vein the ideal of civil society draws its concepts from different historical traditions, ranging from the liberal tradition of Locke and Smith, the neo-marxist traditions, along with other contemporary conceptions. Nonetheless, the paper will employ a non-static definition of the term, which will go on to show the interdependence of the concept with others as will be presented in a later section of the paper. Ramos states that the term Civil Society is constructive when it refers to “not a static entity, but a collection of groups constantly in negotiation, conflict or alliance between each other, the state and the market, in ways that affect both collective and individual outcomes” (Ramos, p.1, 2004)
There are also different understandings of as to what constitutes democracy and the democratization process, which range from procedural to substantive understandings. For the purpose of this paper however Dahl’s conception of a polyarchy would be suitable, wherein he argues that process and substance cannot be separated, and goes on to define it in more maximalist procedural terms. Dahl specifies eight institutional guarantees that facilitate free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, right to run for office, associational autonomy, freedom of expression, and alternative sources of information (Mair, pp. 113-115, 2008). This definition is employed mainly because it can provide us with an ideal type that fits with the current understanding of democracy and is suitable for our analysis.

Social Movement Theory has also been widely debated with different strands trying to account for different kinds of movements in different periods. Some of the theories include the Classical theories, Mass Society theories, Deprivation, Resource Mobilization, Macro-sociological, and other contemporary theories that try to account for the underlying motives beneath the social processes (Buechler, 2016). Most of these theories however fail to provide an adequate explanation partly because of their focus on mono-causality, and can be said to mirror the broader trends in sociological theory of their times. However, because the particular question at hand deals with processes more than the rationale behind the movement, we can opt for a more systems and process based definition that at the same time incorporates motives in its framework. Fuchs analyzes the various theories mentioned above and provides a list of common aspects of social movements based on the various prevalent theories. He argues that all aspects can be theoretically combined by analyzing social movements as self-organizing systems. Such a system has internal logic, but those processes are open to an external environment. Fuch’s conceptual framework helps in bridging the structure/action, and internalism/externalism gap in social movement theory. He also goes on to describe ‘complexity thinking’, wherein there are non-linear relationships between causes and effects. That is an effect may be the result of many causes and a cause may have many effects. This particular framework is essential in understanding the interdependent and non-linear relationship that this paper argues (Fuchs, pp. 108-111, 2005).

Relationships & Interdependency:

A detailed view of the definitions and ideal types presented above reveal that they are non static concepts and rather are open to influence from their environment, and at the same time are highly
dependent on each other. A few relationships among these concepts will be highlighted, to reveal the non-linear character of the relationships and their interdependency.

Going back to the study by Ramos the interdependency of all four of the concepts become evident. He ties the preceding definition of civil society and its aggregate characteristics to the collective activities of the citizens, and argues that the strength of civil society is dependent on the capacity of individuals of the polity to act collectively to further their own interests (Ramos, 2004). The inter-related relationship between civil society, social movements, and democratization becomes evident when social movements as a process is viewed as a form of collective action, and democratization as part of the general interests of the polity. Similarly social capital is also intimately tied to all the other three concepts. In light of social capital theory, Ramos establishes that, “social capital can potentially be activated into forms of collective action that occur in the sphere of civil society, and constitute its dynamic element” (Ramos, 2004). There is no doubt that the above relationship is a complex and dynamic relationship, the paper will however, briefly explore a few relationships that pertain to the subject matter at hand.

Primarily it will be argued that the relationships between all four of these concepts is reciprocal in nature and not linear. This aspect of the relationship has not been accounted for by some theoretical traditions, however such an account is crucial for a better and holistic understanding.

Fukuyama among other scholars argue that civil society must be seen as a result of social capital and not constituting social capital itself (Fukuyama, 2001). However, a more holistic and interdependent systems based view posits otherwise. In the definition of civil society by Ramos, we saw how relationship of the groups constituting civil society impact both individual and collective outcomes. It can be argued that change in social capital can also be a consequence of a collective outcome, and vice-versa. Similarly Ramos argues that collective action effects civil society through ‘everyday’ and ‘contentious’ politics [social movements] (Ramos, p. 13, 2004). Conversely an active civil society that is based on social capital is more effective in creating and sustaining [effecting] social movements (Fayong). Paxton also goes on to show the reciprocal relationship between democratization and social movements (Paxton, 2002). Additionally there are theorists who explores the link between social movements and democracy, a similar link is to be found in the two. Similarly social capital is seen as both a resource and outcome of social movements (Diani 1997; Edwards). All of this lends credence to our earlier assertion that social
capital is not a static concept and that often it is shaped by the very action it helps in creating (Ramos, p.27, 2004). Overall, it is also evident that the concepts under study are highly interdependent, and that they don't have a strictly linear relationship. The next section will deal with the specific question stem in a linear manner, but the understanding developed in this section helps in situating the said process in an overall embedded, non-linear and reciprocal relationship.

Question Stem:

The paper will attempt to analyze the stem in the following two branches.

Social capital & Social Movements:

Social capital plays an indispensable role in the creation and sustenance of social movements. This is due to a number of factors, but primarily it is so, in that social capital provides the necessary resources and cohesion for a collective enterprise such as a social movement. The relationship is also proportional in that increased social capital allows for a more vigorous social movement.

Pre-existing research has pointed out consistently that dense levels and networks of pre-existing social organization among individuals promotes, the emergence, activities, and mobilization of social movements. However, the concept of such forms of levels and networks has only recently been discussed in terms of ‘social capital’. Edward posits that, research has looked at different forms of social organization that facilitate in the emergence and sustenance of social movements; social ties and coalitions, networks, and groups. He argues that social organization per se does not constitute social capital, but that they facilitate social movement actors to access the resources. In order to convert such resources into social capital, the actors must be able to perceive the resources as being present, and secondly it must have an exchange relationship that allows for access to the resource. In such a relationship the ties between social actors exist, but that it does not necessarily carry any cultural or social meaning between the entities (Edwards, pp. 3-4). The relationship between social capital and social movements provided by Edwards, aim to highlight access to resources and a more economic relationship between the actors, compared to the understanding of social capital in terms of goodwill. However, it is still in agreement with our non-static ideal type.

Theoretically as is suggested by wide range of theories from Resource Mobilization, Collective theorists, and other contemporary theorists, social capital plays an indispensable role in the
creation and sustenance of Social Movements. Fayong in his study compares two neighborhoods in China and explores local movements that were directed against developers that were taking over their green areas. Fayong argues that of the two neighborhoods GI and GII, members of GI were able to see the movement through, due to increased social capital compared to GII and also the presence of a strong leader by the name of Tan. GII members on the other hand were easily dispersed due to weak trust and low social capital (Fayong). Similarly the extent of the Arab Spring movement is also credited to high social capital. In this particular example however, media played as an important tool to be utilized by the actors and helped in increasing the overall social capital available to them. Lopes analyzes the role of social media in connection to social capital, and social movements (Lopes, 2014)

Social Movements & the Democratization Process:

It is primarily argued that social movements can both assist and work against the democratization process depending on the nature of the movement, and that additionally social movement can serve as both challengers and maintainers of democracy.

There are different ways in which social movements can impact the overall political atmosphere, it may do so through the creation of new norms, influencing public policy, exerting pressure on elites, or a large-scale restructuring of the society (Bide, 2015). In connection to Democratic and Anti-Democratic waves, Markoff argues that if the nature of the movement is democratic, people in positions of authority will proclaim democracy and if it is the other way around, those in position of authority will express hostility to democracy, and collectively will do away with it. He then establishes his argument through the example of the different democratic and anti-democratic waves in the 20th century (Markoff, pp. 2, 71-98, 1996).

Alternatively social movements and protests are also seen as forming a vital part of a dynamic democracy or a polyarchy as outlined above. Social movements act as both maintainers and challengers of democracy. Fuchs argues that, a political system has its basis in the dispute between different views and values. A political system that is without such a opposition turns towards totalitarianism. Conflict according to Fuchs, guarantees potentialities of dynamic and change. It is in the regard that he views protest and critiques as forming an integral aspect of democratic political system (Fuchs, 115, 2005). Over here what Fuchs considers as protests and critiques matches our ideal type for social movements. Similarly, Del Porta argues that social movements
are intimately tied to democracy, in that they keep those in power accountable (Della Porta, 2013). This is made evident in the examples of the abolition of slavery, civil rights movement, democratization in Eastern Europe, and other examples (Markoff, 1996). Therefore, it is evident that social movements play a critical role in maintaining democracy, which overall can be considered to form part of the democratization process.

Similarly social movements also act as agents for social change, transformation and even as challengers to democracy. As mentioned above social movements interact with their environment. They inward processes are effected by attitudes of the society. Through social movement, the society protests and critiques the relevant status-quo, and in doing so, social movements as whole have the ability to point out ways for social change and transformations. Similarly, depending on the nature of social movements it can in addition to keeping those in authority accountable, even point to alternative forms of governance compared to the one that is prevalent. (Fuchs, pg. 115, 2005; Güell, 2003; Della Porta 2013).

**Conclusion:**

Overall, this paper aimed to provide a general description of the various concepts involved in the subject matter. Using ideal types, this paper additionally explored the different relationships between the concepts, and argued that there exists a non-linear, and interdependent relationship amongst them. The subject matter which was analyzed in a linear fashion, was done so in the broader framework described above. It dealt with the subject matter at hand by arguing that, social capital is indispensable in the formation of social movements. Also that depending on the nature of the social movement, it can both as a challenger and a maintainer towards democracy. That social movement amongst many other process and outcomes, also point towards ways in which the society can transform itself.
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Shah 1

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How has the state been transformed in the face of globalization?

With the swift pace at which one witnesses a radical transformation of the technological and fiscal landscape of the world, the definition of the state is constantly evolving. The nation-state has been brought under increased scrutiny in the rapidly shifting face of transnational relations, the global market, and world politics. On one level, the state can be viewed as a community of people existing together within certain boundaries with a self-contained system of economics and politics managed under the government. On another level, it can be seen as a concept, an institution wherein lies the center of power and control. Torbjørn Knutsen sees the state in terms of territory, defining it as an “independent political community which possesses a government and asserts sovereignty in relation to a particular portion of the earth’s surface and a particular segment of the human population.” Alternately, P. R. Rasmussen’s definition borrows from Max Weber’s idea of a monopoly on the use of legitimate force, with the state seen as a “supreme legitimate authority entrusted with the exercise of violent force over a group of people”. This changing definition can be attributed to the process of globalization, which can broadly be defined as a merging of social, cultural and economic relationships across national borders. J. A. Schlot understands globalization to be a process whereby social relations acquire “relatively distanceless and borderless qualities, so that human lives are increasingly played out in the world as a single place”.

The tense relationship between the state and transnational markets has been understood differently by a range of theorists. Academics like Kenichi Ohmae and Susan Strange have explored what they perceive to be the “end”, or the “retreat” of the nation-state, where the role
of the state has been reduced from an influential, all-powerful force in the past to little more than a marginal actor today. On the other hand, scholars including Peter Evans and Saskia Sassen argue that, rather than a falling away of the state, there is witnessed a transformation of its role from a provider to a regulator, to ensure the smooth functioning of agencies like multinational corporations, international organizations and other transnational firms that operate within a country and overseas. Rather than a decline of state power, I will argue that here has been a reconfiguration of the state’s role; while it no longer exerts as much influence in the areas that it once did, its locus of power has shifted to the new territories charted by the process of globalization. For the objective of this paper, I will restrict my focus to economic globalization, how the role of the state has changed in light of it, and how the purpose of the state is now to regulate, coordinate and service the processes of the global market; “nation states have had to become deeply involved in the implementation of the global economic system, and states have experienced transformations of various aspects in their institutional structure” (Sassen 237).

Economic globalization, as understood by George Sorenson, includes the processes of production, distribution, management, trade and finance. Some well-known features of this form of globalization include, but are not limited to, multinational corporations (MNCs), international organizations (IOs) and private service industries. Multinational corporations, that saw a rapid increase in foreign direct investment in the USA in the 1960’s and 70’s, are understood by economist Richard E. Caves to be oligopolistic agencies in which ownership, production, sales and managerial activities extend over several national systems of law. International organizations are seen as “modifiers of state behaviors” (Toulmin 7) and as “institutions for punishing transgressing states” (Robert and Kingsbury 19). Private service industries comprise companies such as Uber, Airbnb and other industries that dismantle secure employability and contracts with “social sharing” firms and zero-hour contracts. As a result of
economic globalization, the free-flow of money across borders has increased, integrating national and financial capital, making corporate alliances simpler. The “characters of markets, commodities, production and business organization have all shifted to a global perspective”, and high levels of trade, competition, and global markets lead to diminished state control. (Göskel 4).

The state no longer functions as a unitary actor in determining the markets in a particular place. An interest in transfer payments and a desire for rapid economic development functions to reinforce an increased economic focus: as a result, the state is “marginalized as an economic actor” (Evans 1). The extent to which private power can be checked by the state has been brought into question. Alternate modes of employment (the concept of the “gig economy” as described earlier under private service industries, which will be explored further in this paper), moneymaking and control have challenged traditional conceptions of employability, state regulation and involvement in the workforce. An erosion of public institutional capacity is seen, and rapid changes in the international arena, including conceptions of global ideology and the flow of money across borders, has transformed how we view stateness. States no longer function as primary actors, as “wealth and power are increasingly generated by private transactions that take place across the borders of states rather than within them”, and it has become more difficult to “sustain the image of states as the preeminent actors at the global level” (Evans 3).

National governments are no longer in control of the spread of ideas, capital, labor, and technology, and hence have less influence over business transactions. States cannot control the structure of global production networks – “trade is increasingly a flow of goods within production networks that are organized globally rather than nationally” (Evans 3) – and access to capital now depends upon alliances with the owners of global production networks, rather than those that have access to territory. Thus, it has been established that actors no longer
dependent on the political environment of a state. Vincent Cable addresses the disproportion between global financial markets and the economic reserves owned by states: foreign exchange trading exceeds a trillion dollars a day per day, which is greater than the all the foreign exchange reserves held by governments across the world.

The aforementioned transnational economic relations have also seen a rise in the “gig economy”, which includes two forms of work: “crowdwork” and “work-on-demand via apps”: the first refers to “working activities that imply completing a series of tasks through online platforms”, and the second is a form of work in which the “execution of traditional working activities such as transport, cleaning and running errands, but also forms of clerical work, is channeled through apps managed by firms that also intervene in setting minimum quality standards of service and in the selection and management of the workforce.” (De Stefano 2)

These include companies such as Uber, Airbnb, FoodPanda, Careem, and other applications that allow people to use and/or rent their personal resources such as their homes, cars and motorcycles out to the companies that provide these services. While these businesses provide employment to those that possess resources they are willing to market, there is a more troublesome aspect to such private service industries: they have replaced traditional modes of employment, providing competition for taxi companies and hotels, replacing secure employability and contracts with zero-hour contracts and an unstable working environment.

Transnational supply chains, such as Apple which relegates the production of iPhones to China, and the Gap, which produce over 70% of its clothing items in Bangladesh, rely heavily on outsourcing of jobs. The implications of outsourcing are twofold: firstly, it leads to worker exploitation in countries such as Bangladesh, which are targeted due to the availability and willingness of cheap labor; secondly, it results in unemployment in the countries where the companies reside. In 2012, during a dinner with Steve Jobs, then-President Barack Obama asked Steve Jobs what it would take to bring the production of the iPhone back to the United
States, who promptly replied that those jobs would never be returning to the United States — and why would they, when Apple is able to secure a massive profit margin by implementing the use of cheap and effective labor? Accepting this prevailing ideology limits the ability of the governments to protect ordinary citizens, especially those who “bear the costs of shifts in the configuration of international production networks”. (Evans 7)

Having established how the role of the state has been transformed in the face of globalization, this paper will now establish how the purpose of the state is now to regulate, coordinate and service the processes of the global market. According to Saskia Sassen, “Economic globalization has emerged as a key dynamic in the formation of a transnational system of power which lies in good part outside the formal interstate system.” (Sassen 240) However, this does not necessarily mean that the nation-state has been reduced to nothing more than a marginal actor, as Kenichi Ohmae suggests in his work, The End of the Nation State. He argues that “as the workings of genuinely global capital markets dwarf their ability to control exchange rates or protect their currency, nation states have become inescapably vulnerable to the discipline imposed by economic choices made elsewhere by people and institutions over which they have no practical control” (Ohmae 7). The main idea he explores is that the nation-state is becoming obsolete because it is no longer the “optimal unit for organizing economic activity”.

On the contrary, the state remains a key actor in the functioning of transnational corporations, as the so-called “dictatorship” of international finance markets create a mutual hostage situation — adequate formation and implementation fiscal and monetary policies on the part of international actors are required for proper functioning of global markets (Evans). Additionally, interstate systems need responsible regulators — after a certain point, restricting the role of the state is more detrimental than beneficial to profit-seeking endeavors. In the unpredictability of an unregulated business environment, there is a desperate need for a stability
that only the state can effectively provide. An economy of “ideas” depends first and foremost on the implementation of authority, copyright, patent protection, and the securing of intellectual property. Rather than an eclipse of the state, a global economy of ideas requires a more active, competent state to ensure cooperation the following of an agreed upon standard from other states. Effective markets can only exist in the presence of effective, sturdy and secure nonmarket institutions.

As argued by Guido Bertucci and Adriana Alberti in their paper, “Globalization and the Role of the State”,

“the state remains central to the well-being of its citizens and to the proper management of social and economic development. The State is also responsible for adopting policies, which are conducive to greater economic integration. We should not forget that further global integration can be reversed by state policies inimical to openness, as occurred between the two World Wars. In brief, globalization does not reduce the role of the nation-State, but redefines it given the pressures and responses it must give at the local, national and international levels.” (Bertucci and Alberti 11)

Furthermore, the provision of health care and education, public goods, protection of the unemployed, and equal opportunities for all remains the foundational responsibility of the state. National-state capabilities that were themselves “complex reworkings of medieval assemblages” have not now been “destroyed and deterritorialized” but rather “denationalized and reterritorialized” as state procedures come together to serve global economic interests: in terms of “sovereignty and globalization…creating a space economy that extends beyond the regulatory capacity of a single state…these central functions are disproportionately concentrated in the national territories of highly developed countries.” (Sassen 235)

In short, states have been transformed from serving the purpose of providers to that of regulators: a strong state is required to provide an appropriate legal framework to implement
property rights, law enforcement, education etc. Additionally, individual states need to retain the capacity to provide stability: failed and disorderly states cannot provide the stability necessary for the functioning of effective cross-border global relations.


“Strength does not come from physical capacity. It comes from an indomitable will.”\(^1\)

Gandhi said this in his autobiography, *My Experiments with the Truth*, and it truly encompasses the spirit of the Long Walk for the Baloch Missing Persons which made history, by successfully walking the longest distance of more than 3000 km on foot. The long walk was undertaken by the Voice for Baloch Missing Persons, which is a private volunteer-based organization for relatives of the missing persons in Baluchistan. This research essay explores the motivations behind choosing the long march, a non-violent form of protest, as a tactic in a conflict which has been marked by violent opposition for decades. Moreover, it will also look at the tradition of long marches in South Asia.

There is not much research available which specifically focuses on the long walk, its organization and the motivations behind it, as this paper attempts to do. The literature mainly consists of newspaper articles covering the long walk as the participants pass through various cities. An article written by Benazir Shah for *Al Jazeera* includes an interview with Mama Qadeer which offers useful information about the history and formation of the Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP)\(^2\). It also provides some information about what prompted the participants of the long walk to march till Islamabad. Similarly, various interviews of Mama Qadeer and other members of the VBMP on different news channels were also consulted which gave insight into the difficulties faced by the participants during the walk. However, as mentioned above, there is, unfortunately, a lack of serious research into the dynamics of the long walk for Baloch Missing Persons. This research paper mainly focuses on the motivations behind choosing long walk as a tactic of protest and it contends that The Long Walk for Baloch Missing Persons chose a non-violent form of protest because they believed that as a weak and marginalized group protesting against the state, violent struggle cannot provide them a victory.

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In order to fully understand the motivations behind the Long Walk, it is important to understand the history of the conflict in Baluchistan which has sparked a civil war for more than 50 years. When the inevitability of the British exit from India became clear, the Baloch nationalists in Kalat pressured the last Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmed Yar Khan, to work towards the eventual independence of Baluchistan. The Khan repeatedly referred to the 1876 Treaty of Kalat and demanded that the agreements in the treaty should be respected under which Kalat’s status was of an independent princely state ruled by the British.\(^3\) However, the Government of India Act of 1935 established the province of British Balochistan and declared the Khanate of Kalat as part of India, thereby eliminating its independent status. Although the Khan protested against this Act, claiming it to be against the various agreements made with the British including the independent status of Kalat as declared in the Indo-Afghan Boundary Commission in 1896\(^4\), his demands were not paid much heed. However, Baloch nationalists claim that Jinnah, in the capacity of legal advisor to the Khan of Kalat, accepted the special status of Kalat compared to other princely states. Furthermore, in a round table conference in Delhi on August 4, 1947, it was decided that the Kalat State would become independent on August 5\(^{th}\)\(^5\). In addition, Naseer Dashti mentions that a “Standstill Agreement” was signed between the “representatives of the Khanate and the future Pakistani leadership” on August 11, 1947.\(^6\) This agreement is significant because the first clause of the agreement states that the Government of Pakistan accepts that Kalat is an independent state, “different from the other states of India.”\(^7\) This agreement is a point of contention in the conflict because the Baluch nationalists claim that Jinnah agreed to Kalat’s independent status as late as 11\(^{th}\) August 1947. On the other hand, some take the view that the Khanate of Kalat did not have a choice to not join either India or Pakistan since it had been declared part of India in the Government of India Act of 1935.

After independence the state of Pakistan, absorbed the principalities of Kharan, Lasbela and Makran in March 1948. The Khan of Kalat allegedly asked India for help during this time. Although this was never proven, it was enough for the Pakistani state to fully move in on Kalat


\(^4\) “Balochis of Pakistan: On the Margins of History” *Foreign Policy Centre*. 2006, 5-76.

\(^5\) Ibid, 17.


\(^7\) Ibid.
and threaten it with military action. Subsequently, on 30th March 1948, the Khan signed the treaty of merger with Pakistan. It is claimed by the Baluch nationalists that since the Khan decision was to merge with Pakistan was not taken with the approval of the national assembly of Kalat, it is therefore invalid. The Khan’s brother, Prince Abdul Karim Khan, launched the first nationalist struggle against the Pakistani state which continued till 1950. Since then, various armed insurgencies by different nationalist groups have been launched in Baluchistan. The response from the Pakistani state has been to use military force of varying degree to crush the nationalist groups. This strategy has proven to be unsuccessful till now. On one hand it curbs the insurgents for a while but on the other hand, it also strengthens their resolve and grants legitimacy to their cause.

As can be discerned from the information mentioned above, the history and the origin of the Baluchistan conflict is complicated and involves varying interpretations of the historical events which took place before and after partition. Recently, the security and intelligence agencies in Pakistan have adopted the policy of forced disappearances leading to many people having gone missing. The exact figure of the number of people missing is disputed with Baluch nationalists claiming it to be in the thousands while contradictory statements come from the government which on one hand deny any knowledge of the missing persons while some statements argue that while there are detainees, their number is much less.

The Voice for Baloch Missing Persons was set up by Mama Qadeer and Nasrullah Baloch in 2009 after the disappearance of his son Jalil Rekhi. Mama Qadeer’s son Jalil Rekhi disappeared in 2009 and turned up dead at home after three years, with his body containing bullet wounds and burns from cigarette butts. Jalil Rekhi was the information secretary for the Baloch Republican Party and according to Mama Qadeer did not engage in any violent activities. The party is headed by Brahumdagh Khan Bugti and demands independence from

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8 “Balochis of Pakistan: On the Margins of History” Foreign Policy Centre. 2006, 18.
9 Ibid, 5-6.
Pakistan. Mama Qadeer and other members of the VBMP demand that their missing relatives be produced before the court where they can stand trial for any crimes they may have committed.

In an interview with acclaimed journalist Hamid Mir, Mama Qadeer stated that initially their intention was to walk from Quetta to Karachi and stage a sit-in in front of the Karachi Press Club to pressure the government. During their protest in Karachi, Mama Qadeer claims that Khwaja Asif came to the camp under the directive of the Supreme Court and admitted that there were more than 700 people illegally detained by the security agencies. Khwaja Asif also promised to take action within 10 days. However, 3 days later, in a press conference Khwaja Asif denied that there were any people in custody of security agencies. It was at this point that the VBMP decided to march from Karachi to Islamabad.

Now, let us examine the reason behind choosing a long walk, a non-violent form of protest, as a political tactic. The Baluch conflict has been marked by violence from both sides of the conflict which has claimed countless lives. Hence, it is worthwhile to explore that in an environment filled with violence, what were the main motivations behind the VBMP and Mama Qadeer for choosing a non-violent form of protest to press their demands. Johan Galtung in “Pacifism from a Sociological Point of View” presents a structural analysis of the doctrine of pacifism. Galtung defines pacifism as a doctrine which outlines “certain norms concerning behavior in social conflicts.” These include avoiding direct or indirect use of violence in the short and long term which will increase the possibility of reaching a solution acceptable to all parties of the conflict. However, it is important to recognize the different types of non-violence practiced in order to gain a more holistic understanding of why a certain non-violent technique was employed during a conflict. Gandhi distinguishes between two kinds of pacifism or non-violence. One is non-violence for expediency or convenience and the other is non-violence of conviction; “non-violence of the weak” and “non-violence of the strong.”

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15 For the purpose of this essay I will be using pacifism and non-violence interchangeably. Although, there are many theorists who would define these terms as distinct from each other.
The Long Walk for Baloch Missing Persons was an example of using non-violence for expediency or convenience. This kind of non-violence has been classified as passive resistance by Gene Sharp in his work, “The Meanings of Non-Violence: A Typology.” Passive resistance is a method of using non-violent means in a conflict to thwart or achieve social, political or economic changes. According to Sharp, this is preferred to using violence but not as matter of principle, but because “either the resisters lack the means of violence or are not likely to win by such methods.” This is what we find in the case of the Long Walk for Baloch Missing Persons. I conducted interviews with two participants, Aapsaal Baloch and Dedagh Baloch, of the long walk. When asked about the reasons behind choosing long walk, a non-violent protest, as a tactic both the interviewees had similar responses. Both said that they had tried everything from sit-ins, to protesting in from the Quetta Press Club, and that they had even tried the courts. However, there had been little to no benefit of these approaches. Therefore, the VBMP decided to do long walk in order to raise awareness of the issue amongst the people. One of the interviewees, Aapsaal Baloch, was responsible for documenting the entire walk and post it on social media in order to reach out to as many people as possible. During the interview, he kept on commenting how talking about the Baloch issue in Pakistan is a taboo and therefore people don’t know what is going on inside Balochistan. Dedagh Baloch had a similar response. In addition, he said that the VBMP was made primarily for the relatives of the missing persons and is thus a peaceful and democratic organization whose aim is to simply find out what has happened to their missing loved ones. However, when asked whether the violence by Baloch nationalists has exasperated the conflict, he said “What you call violence, people in Balochistan call it taking their rights forcibly.” Furthermore, according to him non-violent methods had not achieved much. The conflict has been going for 70 years and people have tried protesting, gone to the courts and even the Baloch parliament has not been able to do much to resolve the situation.

Therefore, it is clear that the participants of the long walk do not believe in pacifism as a principle. Rather, they engaged in a non-violent resistance because that was the only tactic left for them to use and they did not have the means to use violence. Moreover, Gene Sharp states that the aim of passive resistance is to force the opponent to make desired changes, irrespective

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of whether s/he desires to do so. Another important criteria which distinguishes passive resistance from the kind of non-violence espoused by Gandhi is the attitude hatred which the resisters may hold for the opponent. This attitude was discerned from the both Aapsaal Baloch and Dedagh Baloch. While talking of raising awareness about the issue within Pakistan, a feeling of resentment could be sensed in his tone when he said that people in living in Punjab are oblivious what goes on in the rest of Pakistan. He said that during the walk, when we entered Punjab, majority of the people had no idea about the Baloch conflict or the matter of the missing persons. Furthermore, while talking about the Pakistani state, there was definitely hatred in their voices and attitudes towards the security agencies. As a result, it is clear that the Long Walk for Baloch Missing Persons was not non-violent because of adherence to the ideology of pacifism. Rather its non-violence nature can be attribute to the lack of means of violence available and a strategy to improve the chances of meeting their aim against a stronger opponent.

It is important to consider the historical context and the political culture of Pakistan in reference to long walk/marches. Pakistan has seen its fair share of long walks as a form of protest with different aims. Two of the famous long marches were organized by former Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, on November 16th 1992 and July 16th 1993 during Nawaz Sharif’s first stint in office when the opposition marked the elections as being rigged. Similarly, there were two long marches held for the restoration of the deposed judges including ex-Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. In all of the aforementioned cases, the final destination for these long marches was the capital. In fact, the first long march took place in the July 1980 when the Shia community marched to the capital where the protestors laid siege to the secretariat, practically paralyzing the bureaucracy. They were protesting against the enforcement of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance by the former President Zia-ul Haq. The government gave in to their demands and exempted them from paying taxes to the state. The November 1992 long march to Islamabad by the late Benazir Bhutto successfully forced the late Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the president at the time, to dissolve Nawaz Sharif’s government. Although Prime Minister Sharif was later re-

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19 Ibid
instated by orders from the Supreme Court\textsuperscript{20}. A more recent example is the Azadi March, in August 2014, undertaken by Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf under the leadership of Imran Khan\textsuperscript{21}.

These represent selected examples of the more famous long marches excluding the march by Tahir-ul-Qadri, Nawaz Sharif and others. The frequent use of long marches as a form of non-violent protest marks it as an important of the political culture of Pakistan. There is a dearth of research in this area however it is clear that the long marches are a well-used and significant tactic for political mobilization and raising awareness for a cause. It can also pressurize the opponent to cede to the protestors’ demands by making a show of the numerical support the protestors have. Moreover, marching to the capital is a symbolic gesture of placing one’s demands in the heart of the country. Perhaps, it is not so difficult to understand then why the VBMP chose a long march as a tactic to articulate their demands to the government. Even though it did not attract the kind of attention and numerical strength as the others long marches given as examples in the essay have, the interviewees thought it had an impact. According to Aapsaal Baloch, it brought the plight of the Baloch people in front everyone and the government could not shield the people from it anymore. Moreover, it was covered by the international media and therefore raised awareness of the issue on the international arena.

In conclusion, it is clear from the interviews by the participants and by analyzing the research on pacifism that the Long Walk for Baloch Missing Persons was an of using non-violence due to convenience and because the participants lacked the strength and means for violence. Although it seems that the VBMP seems committed as an organization to use peaceful measures to voice their grievances, it is important to note that the interviewees and Mama Qadeer, by analyzing interviews given by him, were not critical of the tactic of violent opposition employed by the Baloch nationalists\textsuperscript{22}. This further re-iterates the finding that the participants of the Long Walk for Baloch Missing Persons did not use non-violence due to commitment to pacifism but did so for sake of convenience.

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Women Movement: Wheel as a symbol of Resistance

In March 2016, 150 women, wearing orange T-shirts, set out on the streets of Lahore, leaving all the onlookers stunned by the courage and resistance they exhibited. Chanting the message “Hum cycle chalaengae! Hum Agay Barhaingae!” (We will ride the bicycle, we will move forward), these women became an epitome of freedom that every Pakistani woman desires. The struggle for equal opportunities and liberation is not confined to Pakistan. In 1800s, Alice Hawkins, a suffragette, biked around Leicester endorsing the liberation for women, naturally receiving backlash for being one of the first ladies to wear pantaloons in the city. Even the Victorian Era was known for its divisions between men and women in all spheres of life. This changed towards the end of the 19th century when women became active in the social and political domains. The bicycle movement had a huge role to play in this change. In the struggle to reclaim public places and get equal opportunities, bicycle became not only a tool but also a symbol for the emancipation of women. Today, the Women on Wheels movement has become an important part in the international discourse. The Cycling took the form of “a general intoxication, an eruption of exuberance like a seismic tremor that shook the economic and social foundations of society and rattled the windows of its moral outlook” in the 19th century” (Zheutlin). The wheel became a symbol of establishing parity between the two sexes, it enabled
freedom of movement for women, and gave them a newfound independence. Annie “Londonderry” Kopchovsky became the first female cyclist to travel around the world. This achievement liberated her personally and politically. The impact was so remarkable that Susan B. Anthony stated that bicycling had “done more to emancipate women than anything else in the world” (Zheutlin). While the Women on Wheels movement has contributed to international suffrage, freedom and equality, the question stays, how strong has been the role of wheel in the liberation of women in Pakistan?

The scholarship on the women liberation movements shows that the movement allowed women to gain some level of parity with men, gave them freedom of movement, enabled them to join the workforce as well as the social and political arenas, and it allowed them to move away from the restrictive clothing that was characteristic of the Victorian era. The Women on Wheels movement aimed to achieve equality between men and women. It was meant to open more avenues for the women to express themselves other than the confines of their homes. With regards to this, Peter Zheutlin writes about the advent of the “New Woman.” This breed of women had a different “modern” outlook of things ought to be and they were determined to alter the status quo in order to make room for women in all walks of life. The idea was to escape the confines of the home and challenge men in every facet of life. These women wanted to liberate themselves from the tight hold of patriarchy and they used the wheel as a symbol peaceful resistance. Ishbel Taromsari wrote that it is important for people to learn the history of the women’s movement to empathize with women who struggle and to help women who face similar struggles in the present. She wrote that “I believe with all my heart that every woman in the world has the right to cycle; regardless of country or religion.”
Moreover, the movement enabled transportation to be possible for women, they gained freedom of movement which allowed them to let go of their dependence on men, and they were able to join the workforce. They were given physical mobility which meant they were no longer confined to small localities. They could move with ease to places far and wide. The evolution of the bicycle technology from the “Ordinary” to the “Safety” bicycles enabled women to ride the bicycle with ease (Zheutlin). However, critics condemned women from using the bicycle. It was referred to as the “invention by the devil” (O’Malley). The society standards discouraged women to exert their bodies because they were thought to have weak bodies; the seat makes women sexually stimulated, cycling is dangerous and causes ill health, and could lead to death. Ailments such as “cyclists’ sore throat”, “bicycle stoop”, and “bicycle face” were introduced (McCouat). Nonetheless, these criticisms were proved wrong. Women continued to use bicycle to liberate themselves. Bicycle became a manifestation of freedom and was called a “freedom machine” (Zheutlin). Women now could travel to far off places for the purpose of recreation or work, without depending on the opposite gender.

A major transformation that came about due to the use of cycles was the change in dressing. Sarah Gordon reflected on this change and spoke about how women were ready to do away with their restrictive clothing which they had enveloped in by the dictates of the men in the Victorian era. The dressing was meant to show the supposed feminine qualities of women and accent their curves with tight corsets and heavy layering. The dressing symbolized their restrictive lives. The cycling trend required women to take up airy practical clothing and women became aware of the comfort and the freedom of movement this change of wardrobe allowed them. Anne Londenderry was confident that the change in dressing was for the better and she believed that “in the near future all women, whether of high or low degree, will bestride the
wheel, except possibly the narrow-minded, long-skirted, lean and lank element” (Zheutlin). However, the change in dressing was not implemented with any repudiation from different segments of society. The dressing was considered unfeminine, distasteful, and improper. Women who wore “bloomers” were treated like prostitutes and they were fine and prisoned (O’Malley). The loose “bloomers” were seen as an indication of a loose character in a woman. Famous suffragist Willard wrote in her book “A Wheel Within a Wheel: How I Learned to Ride the Bicycle” that she wanted to learn how to ride a bicycle and she wanted other women to do the same so that they could exert power over their lives (Zheutlin). Still, women of high society considered the “rational dress” to be unconventional and improper.

The problem was worse in Muslim societies where the bicycle became a direct conflict to Islam’s concept of veil and chastity. For example, in the Pudukkottai district of Tamil Nadu shows that cycling is a frequently used medium of transportation. Muslim women from a huge range of professions such as agricultural workers and teachers all use cycles to get from one place to another. Even young Muslim women use cycles to commute. Sanaith wrote in her book “Everybody Loves a Good Drought” that Muslim women “abandoned their veils for the wheel.” Without paying heed to what people thought these girls took up cycling as a means to liberate themselves and to get free from the dependence on men. A Muslim girl, Jameela Bibi who started cycling said, “It’s my right. We can go anywhere. Now I don’t have to wait for a bus. I know people made dirty remarks when I started cycling, but I paid no attention” (Sanaith). For Muslim women, cycling became a matter of freedom and self-respect. Cycling provided alternatives to enforced routines and patriarchy-created limitations. As they cycled on the streets of Pudukkottai, some women would even sing on the road, “O sister come learn cycling, move with the wheel of time…” For some, cycling bore economics fruits for women too as it increased
their income and allowed them to spend more time selling their products, without wasting too much commuting time waiting for the bus. The use of the wheel brought women from all religions and segments of society into one unified whole which sought liberation. In midst of the Islamic limitations, in Pakistan, particularly, cycling movements have served as a resistance against harassment, a move toward reclaiming public places and normalizing the presence of women on the streets. This raises the question that despite the limitations posed in Pakistan due to illiteracy and ill-interpretations of Islam, how successful has been the Women on Wheels movement to liberate women from their mundane life?

The scope of the above literature is for it does not include a country specific study on Pakistan. For this reason, this paper explains the significance of women cycle movement in Pakistan through other primary and secondary research gathered from the Women on Wheels movement in Pakistan. The primary research was collected through interviews, observation, and participation in the movement in Lahore on 2\textsuperscript{nd} April 2017. The research was centered on what the movement was trying to achieve and what meaning it held for the individuals present at the scene. This included the organizers, participants, the supporters who cheered on or lend their bikes to the participants, and the bystanders who observed what was happening.

In Pakistan, the wheels of women empowerment were set in motion on 10\textsuperscript{th} January 2016. The Women on Wheels (WoW) rally commenced in Lahore as 150 women motorcyclists came out on the streets to reclaim public places. Prior to the rally, these women were given training by the Special Monitoring Unit on Law and Order and City Traffic Police. Several prominent personalities also attended the rally namely, Australian Ambassador Brigatta Balaha, prominent Lawyer Asma Jehangir, Danish Ambassador Helen Neilson, American Consul General in Lahore Zachary Harkenrider, UN Women Country Representative Jamshed Qazi,
prominent motorcyclist from Singapore Juvena Huang, Provincial Minister for Population Welfare Zakia Shahnawaz and Minister for Women Development Hameeda Waheeduddin. As a part of WoW project, Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif announced that working women and students will be given 1000 pink scooters under a subsidized rate of 50%. According to a police spokesman involved in a project, as of now, 150 women have been awarded pink scooters. The purpose of the rally was to enable women to acquire riding skills and encourage them to be on the roads so they have equal access to resources and opportunities as other men. Asma Jehangir asserted that, “women’s empowerment is at the heart of the socio-economic progress of the country.” While the rally was the first step towards social progression of women in public places, it was greatly criticized for immodesty and going against the principles of Islam. However to provide Security to the women, CCPO Lahore Amin Wains said that “Lahore police will provide all out protection to women motorcyclists. He said that police security will be available to women within five minutes after call on police helpline 15. He said that women can seek help though SMS on 8330 in any emergent situation” (Tribune). The project successfully extended provision of equal opportunity of progress to women and in addition, normalized women’s presence on the streets.

Two months after the implementation of WoW Project, the Girls at Dhaba organized another rally in Karachi, Islamabad and Lahore. The rally was organized in support of Aneeqa Ali, a girl who was harassed, hit and injured by some men in a car while she was cycling to meet the Critical Mass Lahore group recently in Lahore. Aneeqa was riding a bicycle when two men, in a car, followed her and began hooting and honking for her attention. When he ignored them and took the service lane, they followed her there as well and later, hit her with the car. The Girls at Dhaba movement, therefore, aimed to fight for women’s space in public
and to empower them to have freedom of movement without being harassed. Sadia Khatri, the founder of Girls at Dhaba’s said, “Every time something bad happens the immediate reaction is to stay indoors, stay safe. This is a way to say that we (women) can and should be on the streets and have a right to be there as much as anyone else. That is something you think about (girls riding bikes together) and hopefully it will be something that changes what you think is ‘normal’ even on a small level. The idea is for girls to go out on their own. Fear is the biggest thing that stops us from going out and doing anything like cycling or walking and I think when we actually start to do these things is when start to overcome that fear” (DAWN). The activity was organized through the social media which connected borrowers and lenders of bicycles and some male cyclists also lent their bikes to the female participants on the spot. Before the commencement of the rally, the attendees were given instructions about safely cycling on the road. Men, who came to support the rally, stayed behind holding the placards such as, “Aurat ka Pehyaa Chalnay Do, Bhai Chalnay Do” and “Cycle Chalao, Aurton ko Haq Dilao.” One of the cyclists, Eliya Syed remarked that, “It felt great. I live right here, on Khayaban-e-Ittehad and I have never actually cycled on the road so it felt amazing. Even when I was coming here in the morning I wanted to ride to the venue on my bike but my mother insisted on dropping me. That just says a lot. Even right now, when there were so many of us together, there were guys staring at us and passing comments. That was very insulting and that shouldn’t be happening. We need to change that and that’s exactly what is happening right here” (Dawn). Sanayah Malik, one of the organizers, added to that view as she remarked, “These bike rallies aim to give women a platform to reclaim the streets and cycle in public spaces without fear of harassment” (Dawn). The “Girls at Bike” movement, therefore, successfully gave an impetus to all those women who were afraid to use public places as men in Pakistan do.
On 7th April 2017, the Girls at Dhaba organized another Bike Rally in Pakistan and a visit to the rally in Gulberg Lahore showed the accelerated impact of the previous movements organized on the same cause. The number of attendees had doubled and so did their courage and excitement for the movement. A total of 30 women and men were present in Main Market Gulberg, out of which 10 women and 5 men were interviewed. One of the participants, Noor Ansari, while cycling, also wore a sign on her back in solidarity with victims of the attack in Parachinar and to mark her protest against the bomb blast. She said, “I wore so that I can also record my protest as there is a lot of discussion on social media about the lack of media coverage and no discussion over the lives lost.” The passerbys would stop to inquire about the rally and some would even show their solidarity by volunteering to hold placards which said, “Aurat ko rok nahi pae gae!” There were two major challenges that the participants pointed out: Harassment and Fear. Firstly, the participants would be gawked the streets as they would cycle, making them uncomfortable. One of the riders said, “Even right now, when there were so many of us together, there were guys staring at us and passing comments. That was very insulting and that shouldn’t be happening. We need to change that and that’s exactly what is happening right here.” The latter issue encompasses the problem of getting permission from parents to cycle and sometimes, even convincing oneself to go out on the roads. Ayesha Haq, however, brushed aside the fear and said, “Enough of the existing mindset that considers it inappropriate for a female or a gender nonconforming person to be out and about on their own. Let’s cycle together and assert our right to navigate public spaces on our own terms.” On the question of if only elite women enjoy the opportunity to participate in such rally and have their voice heard, Ali Sheikh, a volunteer, said, “This is the start. When people see these women riding bicycles, it already alters their perspective. I see these rally as education. They educate the
people watching them and fight for all the women, rich or poor.” Another rider Mahnoor Malik remarked, “It isn’t that there aren’t women on the streets – even then, the ratio is close to 25 men for each woman – it’s about how women occupy the streets and public space. For one, you will hardly see a woman alone, and if you do, she will either be rushing somewhere or waiting for someone.” Emaan Ali summed up the experience of liberation through cycling by saying, “I loved the feeling of freedom with the breeze in my hair.” The Pakistani women involved has taken bicycles to fight the patriarchal notions that women are supposed to stay within the confinement of their houses and these women also protested against casual harassment on the streets by fearlessly coming out themselves.

The impact of women cycle movement has been momentous as it has set the wheel of change rolling. Firstly, it is normalizing women presence in public spaces, thereby giving them equal access to other facilities as men. It is also giving women the courage to come out and together participate in empowerment project. Most importantly, these movements influence the passerby and other non-active observers to question their existing chauvinistic mindset and change their perspective about women freedom, therefore acting as a form of education for the citizens. Lastly, a lot of other projects have erupted that have been inspired by the Bicycle rally. In March 2017, Women only Taxi called the Pink taxi was introduced in Karachi. The taxis will be driven by women and they will have women passenger’s only, helping women feel safe when hailing a cab. In Lahore, women rickshaw drivers have become more common too.

In a nutshell, there is no tool of development more effective than the empowerment of women and these movements aim to do exactly this. As women ride bicycles, they do not only acquire physical mobility that broadened their horizons beyond the neighborhoods in which they
lived, they also achieved a new-found sense of freedom. The wheel, therefore, has become symbolic in gender literature as it paves way for ideological discussion and manifests the freedom struggles that women face everyday. Even though women’s movement into the public sphere provoked masculine anxieties, which surfaced in ridicule, labelling and harassment, it has pushed women to reclaim the public spaces that have been male-dominated for the longest time. The bicycle enabled movement into new spaces, literally and figuratively. The woman of the nineteenth century who had little opportunity show her autonomy now had a vehicle with which she could not only develop autonomous power, but do so while leaving behind the old reliance upon men for travel.
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